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THE APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL




In the first half of this century, tort theorists became
aware that the application of criminal legislation to negligence
cases presented the potential for institutional conflict between
the legislature and the courts, and that an improper applica-
tion of legislation could impede the development and refine-
ment of negligence theory itself. This awareness spawned a
flurry of scholarship aimed at constructing a theoretical
framework for the application of criminal legislation to negli-
gence cases, and many leading scholars participated in the de-
bate.1 Given the acceleration in legislative activity during that
period,' scholarly inquiry was clearly warranted.
Since the early 1950's, however, there has been little theo-
retical analysis of the ways in which criminal legislation maybe incorporated into negligence cases. 8 But the problems
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis.B.A. 1974, University of California at San Diego; J.D. 1977, UCLA. I wish to thankProfessors Gary Ratner, Kenneth Stroud, Lawrence Wilkins, and William Woodwardfor their insightful comments. I also wish to thank second-year law student Philip
Thompson for his assistance in research.
1. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 COR-NELL L. RaV. 622 (1951); James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in AccidentCases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95 (1950); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legis-lation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negli-gence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 21 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Morris]; Morris, TheRelation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAsv. L. REv. 453 (1933); Thayer,
Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HAav. L. REv. 317 (1914).
2. "The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in American
law. In this time, we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common law,divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become theprimary source of law." G. CAABRasi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1(1982). See also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L.
REv. 401, 401-02 (1968).
3. Most articles written since the 1950's have focused more on how particularjurisdictions have applied the various formulas than on the theoretical underpinnings
of the formulas themselves. Of the many articles taking this general approach, see
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which gave rise to this attention many years ago have not dis-
appeared. Indeed, the tension between court and legislature is
at least as great today as it was in the first part of the century,
as legislative activity has continued unabated,' and persisted
in its move into areas traditionally developed by the courts.'
The judiciary has always jealously guarded its spheres of in-
fluence, fearing that incursions from the legislature would re-
sult in an overall loss of power.' Negligence actions, hundreds
of thousands of which are filed annually in the state and fed-
eral courts, present an especially striking area of potential
Vogan, Torts, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 673 (1978); Com-
ment, Unreasonable Legislative Standards as a Criterion For Establishing Negli-
gence, 25 TEx. L. REV. 286 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Unreasonable Standards];
Comment, Violation of Safety Regulation as Negligence Per Se, 62 Ky. L.J. 254
(1973); Comment, Negligence Per Se and Excuse for Statutory Violation in Texas, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 552 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Violation]; Comment,
Negligence Per Se in Texas: An Analysis of Statutory Excuse and Related Doctrines
with Proposed Special Issues and Instructions, 41 Tax. L. REV. 104 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Statutory Excuse]. But see Holdych, The Presumption of Negligence
Rule in California: The Common Law and Evidence Code § 669, 11 PAC. L.J. 907
(1980); Linden, Tort Liability for Breach of Automobile Lighting Legislation, 45
CAN. BAR REV. 121 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Linden, Lighting Legislation]; Linden,
Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance, 44 CAN. BAR REV. 25 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Linden, Criminal Nonfeasance].
In this article, the term "criminal legislation" will be used in a broad sense, en-
compassing legislation at various governmental levels (federal, state, and local) as
well as administrative regulations, which often have the same force as if they were
specifically enacted by legislatures. On the subject of the application of administra-
tive regulations to negligence cases, see Note, Statutory Negligence - O.S.H.A.
Standard Violation is Negligence Per Se, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 178 (1977-78).
4. Traynor, supra note 2, at 401-02.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been widely adopted, is one exam-
ple of legislative action in areas traditionally developed by courts. Another is the
movement toward adoption of evidence codes, exemplified by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the California Evidence Code. In the negligence area, which will be the
focus of this article, there has not been extensive legislation. However, as will be
shown, the wide variety and scope of criminal statutes has a major impact on negli-
gence cases brought to redress harm caused by their violation.
6. Referring to the tendency of courts to try to protect their power, Justice
Harlan Stone once wrote that statutes are often treated as "an alien intruder in the
house of the common law .... " Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1936). Even as early as 1908, Dean Roscoe Pound noted that:
"[niot the least notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive out-
put of legislation in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with
which that output is regarded by courts and lawyers." Pound, Common Law and Leg-
islation, 21 HAnv. L. REV. 383 (1908). The methods by which courts have attempted
to protect themselves from legislative incursions, including the use of various doc-
trines of "legislative interpretation," will be discussed. See infra notes 35-43 and ac-
companying text.
7. Direct statistical evidence of the number of negligence cases being filed
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conflict between judiciary and legislature. One would imagine
that serious conflict would arise because negligence doctrine is
almost entirely a product of judicial development, and the
courts are increasingly faced with the issue of whether and
how to take note of this growing body of legislative standards.
It is curious, therefore, that while courts have generally
labored so hard to guard their traditional independence in
many areas of law, a large majority of them have accepted a
doctrine which effectively relinquishes to the legislature their
power of doctrinal development for those negligence cases in
which a criminal statute is directed toward the allegedly negli-
gent conduct.' This doctrine, usually called "negligence per
se," amounts to an abandonment of judicial function in negli-
gence cases. The doctrine of negligence per se also requires an
abandonment of the traditional sphere of jury power in these
so fact-oriented cases.10 Little is truly left for the jury in negli-
gence actions when the instructions make clear that there is a
specific standard of conduct, and all the jury is asked to de-
cide is whether the actor did what the statute prohibited, or
failed to take action the statute required. Missing is the jury's
responsibility, under the guidance of the court, to take ac-
count of all the circumstances of the case in deciding whether
across the nation is difficult to obtain. However, the National Center for State Courtsin Williamsburg, Virginia, estimates that in 1976, 12,500,000 civil actions were filed in
state trial courts, of which perhaps 600,000 to 700,000 fall into the category of "torts."Telephone interview with Mary Elsner, National Center for State Courts (Sept. 23,
1982).
Of private cases pending in the United States District Courts for a twelve-month
period ending December 31, 1981, the combined categories of "Marine Personal In-jury," "Motor Vehicle Personal Injury," and "Other Personal Injury," add up to
33,904 cases, representing the largest class of pending cases. FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORK-
LOAD STATIsTIcs, A-12-13 (For Twelve-Month Period Ending December 31, 1981).
8. Despite this general antipathy toward legislation, the courts have pro-
moted the policy of legislation beyond the fondest hopes of the legisla-
tors on occasion. One major example of this is the tendency of courts toimpose tort liability for breach of criminal statutes, where on any fair
reading of the statute one cannot avoid the conclusion that no language
to this effect was included.
Linden, Criminal Nonfeasance, supra note 3, at 35.
9. Negligence per se (or "in itself") is a doctrine which accepts certain criminallegislation as conclusive on the issue of the duty owed by one party to another in a
negligence action. For a more complete exposition of how the doctrine operates, see
infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
10. "Probably there is no class of cases which demands so much jury participa-
tion as those we label 'negligence."' L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 386 (1930).
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due care was exercised by the charged party."
The doctrine of negligence per se also assumes too much
about the ability of legislatures to create rules of conduct
which can be fairly and effectively applied in negligence ac-
tions. The very nature of a legislature's prospective rule-mak-
ing function, especially when considered in connection with its
approach to problem-solving, renders most statutes too nar-
row to permit the flexibility which courts require in negligence
cases.12 Courts must reason in a different manner when decid-
ing individual cases, and the introduction of specific stan-
dards, in situations in which the legislature has not even con-
sidered civil liability, clouds this process and can result in
unjust adjudication.
This article will examine the use of statutory authority in
negligence actions, and argue that the imposition of the negli-
gence per se standard is inappropriate. Properly defined and
administered, a standard under which the violation of a stat-
ute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence better
achieves the goals of courts while giving due deference to leg-
islative power. The problem of excusing violations of statutes
will be specially examined, and the thesis advanced that by
adopting a presumption standard, courts will not have to deal
with the difficult procedural problems raised by excuses, and
indeed, will not have to speak of "excuses" at all.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ADOPTION OF LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS
IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
Even before negligence emerged as the primary basis of
tort liability,"8 courts were trying to come to terms with the
existence of statutes which might make the conduct which is
alleged to be negligent subject to criminal penalty." This was
11. Of course, there may still be questions of causation and damages for jury
determination. However, once the statute has been adopted as setting the standard of
care, there is no longer any place for the common law process of evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the actor's conduct under all the circumstances. Gregory, supra note 1,
at 627.
12. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
14. One of the earliest English cases which grappled with this problem was
Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854). An American case of somewhat later vin-
tage dealing with the problem was Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543
(1889). For a more complete historical analysis of judicial reaction to efforts to im-
pose legislative standards on common law tort cases, see Linden, Criminal Nonfea-
[Vol. 23
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not a particularly urgent problem in an era when criminal leg-
islation aimed at conduct beyond the basic common law
crimes" was not common.' Free to act largely in isolation,
courts spent decades refining the negligence cause of action on
their own. In dealing with the "duty" element of the negli-
gence action, courts attempted to discern general categories of
cases in which it could be said as a matter of law either that
no duty was owed or some duty was owed.17 Further, if a duty
was owed at all, courts devoted much energy to the issue of
whether that duty could be specifically defined to the jury,"
or whether, instead, the jury should be instructed to consider
the conduct of the parties according to the more general stan-
dard of due care under all the circumstances.1'
Because negligence cases can arise out of an infinite vari-
ety of fact patterns,20 courts have typically rejected attempts
sance, supra note 3, at 34-38.
15. Included here are myriad regulations and statutes ranging from traffic laws
to safety regulations aimed at industry, all of which are largely products of this
century.
16. See supra note 2.
17. The task of defining whether any duty is owed under the circumstances of
the case is one for the court. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (I), 28COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1022 (1928), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN
TORT LAW: No PLACE TO STOP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW 153, 161 (2d ed.1977). The duty element can perhaps be viewed as the most crucial in the negligence
action, since it incorporates matters of policy as well as considerations of justice be-
tween the parties. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
18. Included among the specific rules which courts developed were Holmes' fa-
mous "stop, look, and listen" rule regarding railroad crossing cases, declared in Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927). See infra notes 118-23 and
accompanying text.
19. This was the more common solution adopted by courts. Of course, juries are
not actually permitted to consider all circumstances, since courts have declared that
some circumstances about the actor or the conduct are not relevant to the objective
standard which negligence cases use. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224A.2d 63 (1966) (concerning when age may be considered in determining whether due
care was used); Breunig v. American Family Insurance Company, 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173
N.W.2d 619 (1970) (insanity or mental illness).
20. That the kind of conduct about which negligence cases are concerned is al-
most limitless in its variety was made clear by Green:
It would be as futile to attempt to state for the judge the limits of the
law's protection in advance of the particular conduct, as it would be to
state for the jury the sort of conduct they should condemn. Conduct isinfinite in its variety. The most a legal science can do with the classes of
cases here involved is to employ broad formulas for judge and jury and
rely on their respective judgment-passing capacity to dispose of the
cases satisfactorily as they arise.
Green, supra note 17, at 163.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
to carve out rules which, like statutes, state a party's duty in
terms of precise conduct. Indeed, despite the urgings of such
scholars as Holmes to create specific rules of conduct when-
ever possible,"' many of the attempts to state precise, static
rules have met with criticism and, eventually, rejection.2
There is more than just inertia operating in favor of the gen-
eral standard of reasonable care under the circumstances;
more than likely, courts have responded to the need for flex-
ibility in negligence cases and shied away from rules which
could not survive over time.
The generality of the standard used in most negligence
cases also assures that far more cases will reach the jury than
would be true if courts were operating with more specifically
defined standards of conduct.23 It is much easier to survive an
opponent's motion for summary judgment or for directed ver-
dict if the court is not required to apply a standard which will
automatically preclude a finding in your favor under even
your version of the facts. Properly instructed, therefore, juries
are given broad power to determine the nature of the parties'
conduct and to reach a conclusion on the breach of duty (neg-
ligence) aspect of the case.2' Though this large degree of jury
freedom can sometimes result in inconsistent verdicts, the
overall historical judgment clearly indicates a willingness to
accept # modicum of inconsistency to preserve the counter-
21. If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply
with fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man
is presumed and required to know, it is obvious that it ought to be pos-
sible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at least to some ex-
tent, and that to do so must at least be the business of the court. It is
equally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was
bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the circum-
stances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he
was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those
circumstances.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881).
22. This was to occur with regard to the "stop, look, and listen" rule that
Holmes himself would later promulgate. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying
text.
23. As already indicated, jury participation is of major value in negligence cases.
See supra note 10.
24. Where the standard applied is the general reasonable person standard, it
has been suggested that when it instructs the jury, "[t]he court. . . simply tells the
jury that there is a reasonably prudent man, and it is left to the jurors to say what he
would do." Lowndes, supra note 1, at 368. Of course, sometimes there is a need to be
more explicit about the circumstances which the jurors are permitted to take into
account in reaching their decision on this issue. See supra note 19.
[Vol. 23
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vailing value of jury freedom. It is only those more general
policy-oriented duty limitations, such as the basic rule that a
person has no duty to take action when he has not caused the
perilous situation, which have survived at all, and many of
these rules have as well come undone in recent years.2 5 In
most cases, juries are still instructed that they are to deter-
mine whether a party has breached a duty of care owed to
another party according to their examination of all the cir-
cumstances of the case and their perceptions about what a
reasonable person would have done in the circumstances.
It might be asserted that by defining the standard of care
generally and leaving its precise application to the jury, trial
judges are relinquishing a power to control negligence actions,
and this may be true to some degree. But the power is still
there, and in appropriate cases judges will exercise it, whether
such exercise be in the form of directing a verdict or more
narrowly defining the extent of duty owed under the circum-
stances.2 And even though many recent changes in the con-
cept of duty have looked toward an expansion of that con-
cept,"7 the fact that such changes have occurred at all
bespeaks the power of courts to exercise control over the adju-
dicative process in negligence cases.
The negligence system has never operated in complete
isolation, however, and almost from the time negligence be-
came the accepted basis of tort liability, legislative action has
been found to have some relevance to negligence cases. For
example, in an action for personal injuries brought by a po-
liceman who entered a building to investigate an unguarded
back door and fell into an open elevator shaft, it was impossi-
ble to completely ignore a statute which made it a crime to
25. A current example of the elimination of no-duty rules is the erosion of the
rule that a landowner or land occupier owes no duty of care toward a trespasser on
the land. The judicial trend toward rejection of this rule began with Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Though many juris-
dictions have reaffirmed the traditional rule, others have followed the lead of the
California courts. See, e.g., Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d
308 (1971); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445(1969). Even the common law rule that one is not under a duty to come to the aid of
another person he has harmed, as long as the original harm was not caused by the
actor's negligence, has been seriously eroded. See Summers v. Dominguez, 29 Cal.
App. 2d 308, 84 P.2d 237 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 322 comment d
(1965).
26. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
1983]
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leave an elevator shaft unguarded." In that 1883 case, even
though a common law rule had apparently provided that there
was no duty toward a licensee who entered the defendant's
premises, the court still felt a need to give some effect to the
statute which made it a crime to leave elevator shafts un-
guarded.' 9 If a court finds itself compelled to give effect to a
criminal statutory standard in a situation in which a specific
common law rule would have provided for the opposite re-
sult, 0 then a fortiori courts will feel compelled to adopt crimi-
nal statutes when the common law would have provided a
general duty of care under the circumstances, and thus would
at least possibly have reached the same result called for by
the statute.
Something in the nature of legislative action moves courts
to give it effect even when it does not specifically address it-
self to the negligence case which the court must decide. It is a
well-engrained (though not necessarily self-evident) principle
that legislatures are the supreme lawmakers in our system,"1
and perhaps this has provided courts and commentators with
the impetus to accord great deference to legislation. For ex-
ample, in discussing Osborne v. McMasters,8' where a druggist
arguably violated a criminal law by selling a poisonous drug
which he had failed to label, Charles Gregory noted that the
common law evaluative process which would normally take
place in the negligence action has no place at all once the leg-
islature has spoken by making the failure to label poisons a
criminal offense. He then noted that were the normal evalua-
tive process to occur, it would be possible for a jury to reach
the conclusion that conduct which the legislature had made
criminal was not negligent. He went on to say that
such a situation is an absurd paradox, where the conduct
in question has already been officially declared sub-stan-
dard and criminal by the highest legal agency in the state.
28. Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116 (1883); Morris, supra note 1, at 21-22.
29. Curiously, the Massachusetts court overturned itself some years later. Wynn
v. Sullivan, 294 Mass. 562, 3 N.E.2d 236 (1936). See Morris, supra note 1, at 22.
30. When a court adopts a criminal statute for use in a negligence case, and
that statute establishes a duty of care where a prior common law rule would specifi-
cally have negated such a duty, the institutional and theoretical problems are particu-
larly interesting. See infra note 92.
31. Gregory, supra note 1, at 627. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 5; Thayer,
supra note 1, at 342-43.
32. 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889).
[Vol. 23434
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Under such circumstances there is not only no need to
resort to the common-law evaluating process but there is
a compelling reason for not doing so - that is, that the
court or the jury might set another standard in conflict
with that already set by the legislature. This picture of a
common jury competing successfully with the legislature
in establishing the prevailing norm of approved conduct
is, of course, too ridiculous to be tolerated.
Why need this be so? The paradox might not be in the possi-
bility of a jury determining that it was not negligent under
certain circumstances to fail to label poisons, but in the will-
ingness of courts following Gregory's reasoning to abandon to
the legislature their common law power of guidance and con-
trol over the adjudication of negligence cases.34
Though there has been general acceptance of the view es-
poused by Gregory, courts have always exhibited much ambiv-
alence about the degree to which they will allow legislation to
govern their decisionmaking. The many-faceted doctrines of
statutory interpretation, for example, have long served the
desires of courts to limit application of legislation which they
do not wish to govern particular cases.35 The courts have even
developed the maxim that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law will be strictly construed, 6 which gives them the
33. Gregory, supra note 1, at 627.
34. If the common law system of gradual evolution of duty rules were to be
followed, there would be nothing to stop a court from eventually declaring that as a
matter of law, there is indeed a duty to label poisons, and that in a case in which the
defendant admits to having failed to label a poison, a directed verdict on the breach
of duty issue may follow. Indeed, it might well be the legislature's determination that
failure to label poison is a crime which provides the impetus for a judicial change in
negligence law. The point here is not that there is anything wrong with a court fol-
lowing the judgment of the legislature as to important matters of social policy; it is
the compelled nature of such a decision to which exception is taken. Moreover, as will
be developed later, once a court has adopted the negligence per se formula, consis-
tency with the theory underlying that formula leads to evidentiary effects which un-
duly bind the hands of judges and jurors alike and caf' lead to unfair results.
35. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213 (1934); Linden, Criminal Nonfeasance, supra note 3, at 25. It has also been said
that "[t]he traditional judicial weapon in dealing with statutes has always been inter-
pretation of what the written law means." G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 21. And
even more directly, John Chipman Gray once quoted Bishop Headley as saying that
"[wihoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is
he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who
first wrote or spoke them." J.C. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 172 (2d ed.
1931) (emphasis in original).
36. See Raney v. Gunn, 221 Ark. 10, 253 S.W.2d 559 (1952). There, an individ-
19831
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same power to mold even clear legislation to their needs. Such
a maxim hardly comports with the general concept that legis-
lative action is superior. 7 The ability of courts to interpret
statutes in a range from narrow confinement to their precise
language to broad application beyond the language used by
the legislature, also exemplifies the power which accompanies
the right to construe legislation. 8
The interpretative contortions of courts have sometimes
led to legislative construction that can only be called incredi-
ble,"9 though this is often done in order to reach results which
seem fair under the circumstances. For example, in Bird v.
Gabris,4 ° the plaintiff stopped his car on a road one night
ual fenced off a public road which ran over his property. After this, members of the
public ceased using the road. The individual was held to have acquired title to the
road based on common law doctrine, despite the existence of a statute which the
court admitted was intended to prevent "acquisition of title to a public thoroughfare
by adverse occupancy." Id. at 11, 253 S.W.2d at 560. The court made use of the
maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. See
also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 58.01-58.03 (C.D.
Sands 4th ed. 1973).
37. That is, if legislation is to be treated as the statement of a superior power, it
should not matter whether the statute reverses a common law no-duty rule or merely
replaces the generalized reasonable care test. In either case, if the legislature is seen
as having the final power of lawmaking, the result should logically be the same.
38. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. AND COM. 1,
7-8 (1978). For an interesting case raising the issue of narrow versus broad construc-
tion, and pointing out the important impact on the legislature's purpose and policy
which a particular interpretation can have, see Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95
A.2d 71 (1953). There, a state statute prohibited any person convicted of murder
from taking under the will of a victim. The person seeking to enforce the will of the
deceased had been charged with murder but convicted only of manslaughter. The
court construed the language narrowly, and permitted the individual to enforce the
will. This result may or may not have been in accord with the policy behind the
adoption of the statute. See also F. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES 199-200 (1975).
39. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 6 and 33-34. See also Haft v. Lone Palm
Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970). In Haft a man and his
son were found drowned in a motel swimming pool. A state statute (CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 24101.4 (West 1967)) provided that for swimming pools of the type
involved "lifeguard service shall be provided or signs shall be erected clearly indicat-
ing that such service is not provided." The motel operators provided neither a life-
guard nor a sign. The California Supreme Court construed the statute to create a
"primary obligation," which was the maintenance of "lifeguard service," and refused
to allow the defendant to be held to answer only for those damages which would have
been caused by the failure to maintain a sign. Haft, 3 Cal. 3d at 767, 478 P.2d at 471,
91 Cal. Rptr. at 751. This reading of the statute was hardly compelled by its wording,
and appears to represent the court's own view of the policy behind the statute. There
is little reference to legislative material which might support this conclusion.
40. 53 Mich. App. 164, 218 N.W.2d 871 (1974).
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when he noticed that there were telephone lines stretching
across the intersection. He got out of the car to look, carrying
a flashlight. When he saw the defendant's car approaching the
scene, plaintiff tried to slow it down by waving the flashlight.
Despite plaintiff's warning attempt, defendant did not see the
wires crossing the intersection, and his car struck them, caus-
ing them to snap and strike the plaintiff. There was testimony
that when he was waving the flashlight, plaintiff was standing
on the travelled portion of the road, in violation of a Michigan
statute41 providing that "pedestrians" should use sidewalks or,
when not provided or when it is impracticable, should walk on
the left side of the highway facing traffic passing nearest.
Even though a second statute42 specifically defined "pedes-
trian" as "any person afoot," the court construed the language
as not including the plaintiff. In reaching this interpretation,
the court noted that if the statute were to be read literally, it
would include "a traffic control officer, emergency personnel,
persons alighting from their vehicles for the purpose of walk-
ing to a sidewalk, persons crossing the highway, . . ." and
others to whom it was obviously not intended to apply.43
While it certainly seems reasonable to construe the statute as
not prohibiting the plaintiff's conduct, it is not at all clear
that the legislature would have wished to encourage the plain-
tiff to place himself in this kind of peril by getting out of his
car and walking on the roadway. On the other hand, since the
plaintiff's motives were admirable, it would seem unduly
harsh to penalize him by refusing to permit him to recover for
injuries suffered in his endeavor. Thus, while the result may
not perhaps accord with the legislative will, it might neverthe-
less be a fair one.
Despite this ambivalence about legislation, courts have
uniformly concluded that when certain conditions are met,
criminal legislation must be accorded a place in the negligence
action. The rationale for this conclusion has not been consist-
ently explicated." Some years ago, courts would justify the
imposition of civil liability for violation of criminal statutes by
declaring that they were merely enforcing the legislature's de-
41. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.655 (1977).
42. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 257.39 (1977).
43. 53 Mich. App. at 167-68, 218 N.W.2d at 873.
44. For an excellent historical review of this problem, see Linden, Criminal
Nonfeasance, supra note 3, at 35-44.
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
sire to impose such liability.4' This, however, is a dubious con-
clusion given that the statutes with which we are dealing
make no declaration about civil liability, but concern them-
selves only with criminal sanctions. It is most commonly the
case that there is neither a positive nor a negative legislative
intent regarding civil liability.4" More recently, courts and
commentators have theorized that the motivation for use of
criminal standards in negligence actions is to apply indirect
pressure for conformance with the criminal statute47 or, as
Prosser stated,"s to further the underlying purpose of the stat-
ute. This rationale is far more sensible, particularly since it
grants the court the power to adopt the criminal standard,
rather than holding that the court is adopting the standard
because the legislature has so mandated. As will be argued be-
low,4' any defensible theory for utilizing criminal legislation in
negligence cases requires that the power to decide the stan-
dard of care remain with the court.
The interesting thing is that faced with a spectrum of
choices of the effect to be given such legislation, courts have
largely adopted the negligence per se theory, a doctrine which
grants the greatest power to the legislature, and thus most se-
verely circumscribes the courts' own traditional rule-making
authority. That doctrine provides that if the statute applies at
all, it is conclusive on the duty issue, and its breach will es-
tablish negligence without resort to the common law evalua-
tive process.'0 As legislatures become more active in their law-
making pursuits, the issue of the propriety of this doctrine
becomes more acutely joined. If we really live in the "age of
statutes,"' 1 a reexamination of a doctrine largely expounded
before the effects of the explosion of statute-making were
fully appreciated is certainly in order.
45. Id. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW Op TORTS 995 (1965).
46. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 45, at 995; J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
TORTS 128 (3d ed. 1965).
47. Linden, Lighting Legislation, supra note 3, at 122-23.
48. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 at 191 (4th ed. 1971). See also Note,
Nonfault Liability for. Vehicle Equipment Failures, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1112, 1133
(1971).
49. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
50. Gregory, supra note 1, at 631; Thayer, supra note 1, at 322.
51. G. CALAnxZsi, supra note 2. The title of his first chapter is "Choking on
Statutes." Grant Gilmore said that legislatures have been involved in an "orgy of
statute making." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
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First, however, we must examine the method by which
courts (whether they adopt the negligence per se standard or
some other theory) determine whether the criminal statute
will bear at all on the negligence action. This process has been
well documented.5e The first and most basic question a court
faces is whether the criminal statute sets a standard of care
which can replace or supplement the safety standard which
the common law would have imposed (if any).53 Most com-
monly, this threshold question has been broken down into
several components, with courts inquiring whether the statute
was designed to prevent the type of harm which occurred in
this case; and whether the statute was intended to protect
from that harm a class of persons which includes the harmed
party.5 However it is stated, the basic question is whether the
statute sets a standard of conduct which can take the place of
or supplement the common law standard which would other-
wise be applied to the case.
This issue is one for the judge to decide, not only because
it is considered in part a matter of statutory construction and
thus a "question of law," 5 but also because it is really a ques-
tion of relevance. That is, unless the statute explicitly or im-
plicitly sets a standard of care, it neither informs the court of
the nature of the duty owed nor defines the conduct which
will satisfy that duty. In such a case, evidence of the existence
or violation of the statute is of no relevance to the questions
of duty and breach, the only issues in the negligence case on
which it can have any bearing." The court's resolution of this
52. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 1; James, supra note 1; Morris, supra note 1.
53. "It is only when a criminal statute provides a standard of conduct - a way
of doing what the defendant did or failed to do in any particular case in question -
that a court should permit its breach to be considered as a basis of civil liability at
all." Gregory, supra note 1, at 625. See also Morris, supra note 1, at 42.
54. Gregory stated that the court should be "satisfied that the statute is a
safety measure designed to prevent the hazard which occurred and to protect the
interest affected from the damage sustained. "Gregory, supra note 1, at 629. See
also James, supra note 1, at 112.
55. Sometimes, the task of determining the legislative intent can be a very flex-
ible one, bringing into play all the interpretative machinations which have already
been discussed. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
56. See FED. R. EvID. 401, which defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence hav-
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." When a legislature passes a statute which does not implicitly prescribe
conduct which constitutes due care under specified circumstances, evidence of its vio-
lation can have no proper purpose in a negligence case. Such evidence can only serve
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issue can thus make an important difference in the case, since
a decision that the statute does not set a standard of care
should be accompanied by a decision that the jury cannot
hear any evidence of the existence of the statute, 7 and thus
cannot be affected by knowing that the conduct in question is
subject to criminal penalty.5 8
This point is best illustrated by licensing statutes. Typi-
cally, they cannot be held to set a standard of care because
they neither proscribe nor require the taking of specific ac-
tion. Rather than dealing with particular conduct, licensing
statutes normally provide only that a certain enterprise (usu-
ally broadly defined as a general activity such as the practice
of a profession or the driving of a vehicle) cannot be under-
taken without first obtaining a license." Since, for example, it
the probably prejudicial purpose of informing the jury that the party has done some-
thing proscribed by criminal law, and thus encourage the jury to find the party negli-
gent because he is "bad." This purpose would be proscribed by FED. R. EVID. 403,
which excludes evidence, inter alia, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "
57. See FED. R. EvID. 402, which provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant
is not admissible."
58. Leaving the jury uninformed about the violation of a criminal statute in
some cases could have a major impact on the jury's view of the negligence question.
Certainly, knowing that a criminal statute proscribes some aspect of the party's ac-
tions would affect the minds of most jurors, though the weight which would be given
to such a violation would vary greatly depending on the statute involved. In Brown v.
Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926), for example, defendant, an unlicensed chi-
ropractor, medically treated the plaintiff, and plaintiff claimed that she suffered harm
as a result. Because the statute which defendant violated did not prescribe a standard
of care, but only required that persons offering medical treatment be licensed, the
court properly found the defendant's violation of the statute to be irrelevant. How-
ever, it is easy to see how a jury, if informed of the statute and its violation, might be
extremely swayed against the defendant. After all, as a logical (if not a legal) matter,
had defendant not practiced medicine without a license, the harm would not have
occurred. In such a case, the prejudicial impact of evidence of the statute or its viola-
tion could be substantial.
In other kinds of cases, however, the impact of not being informed about the
statutory violation might be much smaller. For example, in a normal traffic accident
case, jurors might well be aware that the party's conduct, as described by witnesses, is
in violation of a traffic law, even if for some reason this fact is not made explicit.
Though such knowledge should not be used by jurors, it is doubtful that they would
completely ignore it. However, if the traffic violation were one which many persons -
the jurors included - commonly commit, then it may not be given much weight in
any event.
59. Referring to Brown v. Shyne, Gregory stated:
The real reason that the licensing statute in question cannot operate in
any way as the basis of civil liability is that it establishes no standard of
conduct - it does not stipulate that any particular human act, let alone
anything which the defendant happened to do in practicing on the per-
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is not held to be the judgment of the legislature that it is in-
herently dangerous to practice medicine or drive a car with-
out a license, breach of the licensing statute can have no bear-
ing on the negligence issue. 0 In sum, then, statutes which
neither forbid nor require the taking of specific action cannot
properly be held to set a standard of care, and evidence of
their violation, or even their existence, should not be put
before the jury.
As already indicated, unless the harm which occurred in
the case was the type of harm which the statute was designed
to prevent, the legislation will not be held to have any bearing
on the case. This principle was firmly established at common
law in Gorris v. Scott."1 And as in any negligence case, the
son of the plaintiff, must be done in any prescribed fashion.
Gregory, supra note 1, at 631-32.
60. Whether a statute meets the test of establishing a standard of care is not
always such an easy decision to make and depends in part on the way the test is
viewed. If, for example, the test is viewed broadly as simply an inquiry into whether
the statute was passed for a safety purpose, then even such statutes as that involved
in Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) could conceivably meet the
test. After all, there can be little doubt that the legislature was at least partly con-
cerned with protecting the public from the unsafe practice of medicine when it passed
the statute. However, if the test is viewed more narrowly as one inquiring into
whether the safety statute requires or proscribes particular conduct deemed unsafe in
itself, then the licensing statute in Brown v. Shyne does not pass the test. It is not in
itself unsafe to practice medicine without a license, for the possibility that a particu-
lar person is unqualified to practice medicine might be only one reason why he or she
does not possess a license.
A recent Michigan decision illustrates the confusion concerning the relevance of
licensing statutes in negligence actions. In Turi v. Bozek, 79 Mich. App. 212, 261
N.W.2d 264 (1977), the court, citing no legislative history as authority, construed a
motorcycle driver licensing statute as "intended to protect against accidents involving
motorcycles driven by persons who have not been legally recognized as competent in
their operations." 79 Mich. App. at 215, 261 N.W.2d at 266. The court noted that
plaintiff (the unlicensed motorcycle driver) was a member of the class which the stat-
ute sought to protect, and that his failure to obtain a license would bear on the issue
of contributory negligence. If Brown v. Shyne was correctly conceptualized, Turi v.
Bozek is wrongly decided.
61. 9 L.R.-Ex. 125 (1874). There, a number of sheep which the defendant ship-
owner had contracted to carry for the plaintiff were washed overboard during the
shipping. A statute required that sheep and cattle being shipped to ports in Great
Britain be penned on the ship in a certain manner, including the use of foot-holds.
Plaintiff sued on a theory of negligence, attempting to use the statute, which defen-
dant had violated, as the source of the duty owed. The Court of Exchequer, however,
rejected this contention, holding that the statute, which was entitled the Contagious
Diseases (Animals) Act, was passed "merely for sanitary purposes." Since it was not a
statute designed to prevent the type of harm which occurred (drowning), the plaintiff
could not use its breach to form the basis of the action.
It should be noted that the clarity with which the act in Gorris set forth its
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breach of the statute must also be a cause of the harm before
the plaintiff can succeed, even assuming that the statute is
held to set a standard of care. 2
Once a court determines that a criminal statute sets a
standard of care which makes it relevant to the negligence ac-
tion, the court must decide what effect the statutory standard
has on the standard of care which would otherwise be applica-
ble to that case, and must instruct the jury accordingly.a On
this question, there is a continuum of possibilities, and this
can best be understood by examining the procedural effect
which each would have on the action. For purposes of this
analysis, we will assume that the defendant is the party whose
alleged negligence is based upon a violation of a criminal stat-
ute, and that the statute has been found to set a standard of
care.
At one end of the spectrum, the statutory violation can be
viewed as "mere evidence" of negligence." Unless the judge
decides otherwise,65 the common law duty remains unchanged,
intent made the court's job of interpretation unusually easy. In many other cases, the
purpose of the enactment will be sufficiently shrouded to leave enormous room for
judicial interpretation.
62. Gregory, supra note 1, at 629-30. This, too, can sometimes be a difficult
determination to make, though it does render certain results easier to understand.
Returning to Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926), it can be seen that
even assuming the statute passes the relevance test by being held to set a standard of
care, it is not true that the violation of the statute brought about the harm to the
plaintiff. Certainly, had the defendant not practiced medicine at all, the plaintiff
would not have been harmed by him, but it was the particular manner in which he
treated the plaintiff that brought about the harm, not the fact of his being unli-
censed. As the New York court said in Brown:
(T]he license to practice medicine confers no additional skill upon the
practitioner; nor does it confer immunity from physical injury upon a
patient if the practitioner fails to exercise care. Here, injury may have
been caused by lack of skill or care; it would not have been obviated if
the defendant had possessed a license yet failed to exercise the skill and
care required of one practicing medicine.
242 N.Y. at 180, 151 N.E. at 198.
63. James, supra note 1, at 106; Morris, supra note 1, at 27; Thayer, supra note
1, at 317.
64. Lowndes, supra note 1, at 369; Morris, supra note 1, at 34-35; Thayer,
supra note 1, at 322.
65. There is still room under this standard for the judge to determine that as a
matter of policy, the statutory standard should replace the standard which would
have applied in the absence of the legislation. Surely if the judge has the responsibil-
ity to define the nature of the duties owed under the circumstances of the case, the
judge should be free to decide that the statutory standard is more sensible, and to
instruct the jury in accordance with this view of the applicable duty of care. But if
the judge so decides, he will have done so as a matter of choice. This element of
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and the judge will instruct the jury that the violation of the
statute is but one factor which may be considered in deter-
mining whether the defendant was negligent. Proof that the
statute was violated will have no special procedural effect on
the action, and indeed may not in some cases even suffice to
meet the plaintiff's burden of producing evidence of negli-
gence.6e Therefore, defendant will have no formal obligation
to come forward with evidence of due care, 7 and it may even
be possible, should defendant produce evidence of due care,
that such evidence will be sufficiently strong to require that
the judge direct a verdict in her favor on the negligence issue.
The effect of proof of the violation of the statute, therefore, is
merely to create an inference of negligence" which may or
may not be sufficiently strong to defeat defendant's motion
discretion differentiates the evidence of negligence approach from negligence per se,
in which the underlying theory compels the court to adopt the statutory standard.
See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
66. A party who bears the burden of persuasion on an issue typically bears the
burden of being the first to produce evidence on that question. 9 J. WIoGMo, WI-
MORE ON EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940). In a negligence action, the burden of produc-
tion will fall on the plaintiff since it is the plaintiff who must persuade the jury of the
defendant's negligence. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. Satisfying the
burden of production amounts to satisfying the court that the party has produced "a
quantity of evidence fit to be considered by the jury, and to form a reasonable basis
for the verdict." 9 J. WIoGMio, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2487. It is thus a threshold
question which must be answered in the affirmative before the jury will even be per-
mitted to consider the evidence produced by the party bearing the burden of produc-
tion. As viewed by the "mere evidence" standard, proof of the statutory violation will
be but some evidence of negligence, and the judge in each case will have to determine
whether this evidence is sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's burden of production.
Just what quantum of evidence is required to satisfy a burden of production has
been defined in a number of ways. It is generally held that a "scintilla" of evidence
will not suffice, though a great deal more is probably not required. The more direct
evidence on the issue offered by the party, the more likely the burden will be met.
However, circumstantial evidence alone (and the statutory violation is but circum-
stantial evidence) can suffice. See generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.11 (1965).
67. Though defendant has no formal obligation to come forward with evidence
of due care, it would usually be folly not to produce whatever evidence he has to
support a conclusion that he exercised due care. Thus, since the statutory violation at
least constitutes some evidence of negligence, it is assumed that defendant will nor-
mally come forward with contrary evidence. The point, however, is that under the
"mere evidence" standard, there is no procedural device which requires this result
under penalty of a directed verdict against the defendant.
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600(b) (West 1966) defines "inference" as "a deduction of
fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action." (emphasis added). The permissive na-
ture of an inference demonstrates its minor procedural effect on the action. See also
F. JAMES, CiVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9 (1965).
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for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case.
Jurisdictions adhering to this "mere evidence" of negli-
gence standard are apparently in a small minority.:6 And
though the approach is attractive in its retention of judicial
power to define the duty of care, as well as jury power to view
all circumstances before determining breach of the duty, it
may suffer from the problem of granting too little deference
to a legislative determination about the nature of certain
conduct.70
A second possible effect of proving that defendant has vi-
olated an applicable criminal statute is to hold that such evi-
dence satisfies plaintiff's burden of producing evidence of neg-
ligence. This has sometimes been referred to as making out a
"prima facie" showing of negligence. 1 In this sense of the
term "prima facie," plaintiff will only have assured that he
will defeat a motion for directed verdict made at the close of
his case. However, the burden of production will not shift to
defendant once the statutory violation has been proven,72 and
though adducing no evidence of due care carries risks for de-
fendant, those risks will normally reside in a jury determina-
tion that she was negligent rather than in a directed verdict
for plaintiff at the close of defendant's case. 3 Importantly,
69. See W. PROSSER, supra note 48, § 36, at 201 n.27. Lowndes also asserted
that this standard described the appropriate effect of criminal statutes in negligence
cases, if indeed such statutes ought to be considered at all. Lowndes, supra note 1, at
369.
Even though few jurisdictions hold that violation of a state statute will only con-
stitute evidence of negligence, there appears to be a larger number of jurisdictions
which hold violations of municipal ordinances and enactments of other local bodies to
be only some evidence of negligence. Courts sometimes support this view by stating
that local bodies do not have the same fact-gathering abilities as do state legislatures,
or that strict adherence to local standards may lead to loss of uniformity in the com-
mon law because of small differences in the location of the action. More likely, courts
simply do not trust the judgments of inferior legislative bodies. See Linden, Criminal
Nonfeasance, supra note 3, at 56-57.
70. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
71. Wigmore indicates that "prima facie" can have at least a couple of mean-
ings. 9 J. WIOMORE, supra note 66, § 2494, at 293-96. As used here, the term "prima
facie showing" of negligence means only that by proving defendant's statutory viola-
tion, plaintiff will have satisfied his burden of production on the negligence issue.
"Prima facie" is also used in connection with presumptions, though to avoid con-
fusion, that term will not be employed here.
72. Wigmore stresses that used in this way, the production of "prima facie"
evidence will not serve to shift any burden to the other party. Id.
73. Once again, however, defendant would be foolish not to produce some evi-
dence of due care. And indeed, there may be some cases in which plaintiff's evidence
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adoption of this standard, as with the "mere evidence" stan-
dard, retains judicial power to determine the existence and
extent of the duty of care owed. The statutory standard does
not replace that of the common law.
It is difficult to determine whether any jurisdictions have
adopted this standard. The Michigan Supreme Court has de-
clared that the violation of a criminal statute will create a
"prima facie case," 4 but it has not defined the precise proce-
dural effect which this should have on the action. Intermedi-
ate appellate courts have been grappling with that question
ever since.75 The Illinois courts have been similarly vague
about their meaning when they declare the violation of a
criminal statute to constitute "prima facie" evidence of negli-
gence. e In any event, if the true effect of this standard is not
to shift any burden once the statutory violation has been
of negligence, which includes the statutory violation, may be so strong as to justify a
directed verdict in plaintiff's favor should defendant not come forward with some
evidence of due care.
74. Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270 (1976). At one point in the
opinion, the court speaks of the creation of an "inference" of negligence: "[T]he real
Michigan rule as to the effect of violation of a penal statute in a negligence action is
that such violation creates only a prima facie case from which the jury may draw an
inference of negligence." Id. at 128-29, 243 N.W.2d at 276 (emphasis added). One
paragraph later, the court states: "In a growing number of states, the rule concerning
the proper role of a penal statute in a civil action for damages is that violation of the
statute . . . establishes only a prima facie case of negligence, a presumption which
may be rebutted . . . ." Id. at 129, 243 N.W.2d at 276 (emphasis added).
75. In Baumann v. Potts, 82 Mich. App. 225, 228-32, 266 N.W.2d 766, 768-70
(1978), an appellate court assumed that proof of a statutory violation created a pre-
sumption of negligence. Though the court seems to have assumed that this shifted
the burden of production, it rejected the contention that the presumption could only
be overcome by "positive, unequivocal, strong, and credible" or "clear, positive, and
credible" evidence. The court also held that the burden of persuasion does not shift
to the violator once the violation has been proven. Id. at 223, 266 N.W.2d at 771.
Later, another appellate panel decided Hack v. Foster, 89 Mich. App. 254, 280
N.W.2d 503 (1979). That court also held that proof of the statutory violation created
a presumption of negligence and said that even when the violator offers rebuttal evi-
dence on the negligence issue, the presumption remains in force as a "permissive in-
ference." If the jury finds that the force of the presumption is only equally opposed
by the rebuttal evidence, the presumption is "mandatory" and requires a finding of
negligence. This seems to indicate that the burden of persuasion is shifted to the
violator. Id. at 258, 280 N.W.2d at 505.
Whatever these holdings truly mean, it seems clear that the supreme court's in-
tent in Zeni was later viewed as including the creation of a presumption once the
statutory violation has been proven. See supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 II. 2d 380, 356 N.E.2d 93 (1976),followed in Loschiavo v. Greco Contractors, Inc., 106 Ill. App. 3d 556, 435 N.E.2d 702
(1981).
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proven, it is not likely to have any greater procedural effect
than the "mere evidence" standard, and will therefore suffer
from the same theoretical deficiencies.77
Another view of the effect which proof of the violation
should have is that such evidence creates a presumption of
negligence, rebuttable by evidence that despite the violation,
defendant exercised due care.78 There is no question that a
presumption has a greater procedural effect than a mere infer-
ence of negligence, but there are different theories about the
extent of the procedural effect of presumptions. It would be
beyond the scope of this article to attempt to fully explain
these differing views.7 9 We can assume that there are theoreti-
cal merits to either approach, and examine the effects which
the adoption of either would have on the problem to which
this article is addressed. The first theory, which has come to
be identified with Thayer and Wigmore and has been dubbed
the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions, 0 would hold in
this situation that proof of the violation satisfies plaintiff's
burden of going forward with evidence of negligence, and
shifts to defendant the burden of producing evidence of due
care. The burden of persuasion on the negligence issue re-
mains with plaintiff. Crucial to this view is that once defen-
dant has come forward with evidence of due care, the pre-
sumption disappears entirely from the case,81 and should not
be mentioned in the jury instructions. The practical effect of
this standard is that proof of the violation of the statute will
assure plaintiff that he will defeat defendant's motion for di-
rected verdict at the close of plaintiff's own case, and unless
77. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
78. As already indicated, the term "prima facie" is sometimes used in connec-
tion with presumptions. See supra note 71.
79. For further elucidation of this issue, see 9 J. WIGMOR, supra note 66, §§
2490-2493; J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, ch. 8 (1898); E. MORGAN,
BAsIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, ch. 3 (1963); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 345 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
80. See 9 J. WIOMORB, supra note 66, § 2491; J. THAYER, supra note 79, ch. 8.
81. This is the majority view of the effect on a presumption of evidence offered
to rebut the presumed fact. Wigmore stated that presumptions are "like bats of the
law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 2491 (quoting Lamm, J. in Mackowik v. Kansas City, St.
J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906)). See also Bohlen, The
Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L.
REv. 307, 314 (1920) ("Like Maeterlinck's male bee, [presumptions] having func-
tioned they disappear."). The "bursting bubble" approach appears to have been
adopted in FED. R. EVID. 301.
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defendant comes forward with evidence sufficient to satisfy
her burden of production,'. plaintiff should be able to success-
fully bring a motion for directed verdict on the negligence is-
sue at the close of defendant's case. 8
The second presumption theory, which has been closely
associated with Morgan and McCormick,s' would hold in this
situation that once the statutory violation has been proven, a
presumption of negligence will arise and the burden of per-
suasion will shift to defendant to prove due care.a8 Because
the presumption has the procedural effect of shifting the bur-
den of persuasion rather than just that of producing evidence,
and because this theory views presumptions as having impor-
tant public policy purposes, s defendant's presentation of evi-
dence of due care will not dissolve the presumption. Rather, it
remains a part of the case and may even be a part of the jury
instructions, though this is not a necessary consequence of the
approach.8 7 This view of the effect of a statutory violation has
been adopted in California."8
The two presumption approaches have an important
82. See supra note 66. That this may not be too difficult a burden for defendant
to satisfy will be discussed later. See also infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
83. This presumption standard may have been adopted in Michigan, though the
courts have not yet fully clarified the issue. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
84. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 74-81 (1956); C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 79, § 345.
85. E. MORGAN, supra note 84, 74-81; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 345. Of
course, if the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, the burden of production
will shift along with it.
86. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 345. The California Evidence Code recog-
nizes that some presumptions are intended "to implement some public policy other
than to facilitate the determination of the particular action. . . ." (CAL. EVID. CODE§ 605 (West 1966)), and declares that with regard to those presumptions, the burden
of persuasion will shift upon proof of the basic fact (in our case, the statutory viola-
tion). Evidence Code section 669 declares the presumption of negligence which arises
upon proof of a statutory violation to be such a presumption, and therefore the bur-
den of persuasion will shift to the violator to demonstrate due care. CAL. Evm. CODE §
669 (West Supp. 1983).
87. The California courts do not mention the presumption itself in instructions.
See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 86. CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (West 1967) was enacted in con-
formity with the state supreme court decision in Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327
P.2d 897 (1958). Defendant can meet the burden of persuasion on the negligence is-
sue by demonstrating that he "did what might reasonably be expected of a person of
ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with
the law. . . ." CAL. Evm. CODE § 669(b)(1) (West 1967). For a detailed analysis of
this rule, see Holdych, supra note 3.
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quality in common with the "mere evidence" and "prima facie
evidence" standards. Their common element is the mainte-
nance of judicial power to determine the existence of a duty in
the negligence case, and to decide whether that duty should
be more carefully circumscribed than by the general "reasona-
ble care under all the circumstances" formula. Moreover, be-
cause breach of the duty will normally be determined accord-
ing to a full review of the precise circumstances of the case,
the jury retains its traditional power to decide exactly what
constituted due care in that situation. However, there is a vi-
tal functional difference between the presumption approaches
and either of the two previous theories. While the presump-
tion approaches place at least some onus on the violator to
come forward with evidence of the exercise of due care, the
"mere evidence" and "prima facie evidence" standards will
seldom so adversely affect the violator. Where those standards
are employed, proof of the statutory violation will have little
procedural effect on the action, and this essentially means
that the legislative determination about the quality of partic-
ular conduct will not, as a matter of law at least, be subject to
much deference.
The final approach which may be adopted is the theory to
which this article is primarily addressed: negligence per se.
According to this theory, proof of the statutory violation, ab-
sent limited excuses, will conclusively establish that the de-
fendant was negligent.8" The element of the negligence per se
approach which makes it entirely different from any of the
theories which have thus far been described is that the duty
of care which would have governed the case at common law (if
indeed the common law would have prescribed any duty at
all) is completely supplanted by the standard of care implicit
in the criminal statute adopted by the legislature. The theory
underlying negligence per se holds that this result is man-
dated by virtue of the legislature's position as supreme
lawmaker.9 While courts and commentators have been careful
to point out that the action does not thereby become one on
the statute, remaining instead a common law negligence case
89. See Gregory, supra note 1, at 626-27; Thayer, supra note 1, at 325-26. Proof
of the violation, of course, only establishes the duty and breach elements of the ac-
tion. Plaintiff must still show causation and damages as in any other negligence case.




in which the standard of care derives from the legislature,' 1 it
should be clear that both judge and jury abrogate extensive
power to the legislature under the negligence per se ap-
proach.' 2 The judge may not engage in the usual weighing
process in determining whether and to what extent a duty is
owed. The jury's only inquiry on the question of breach of the
duty is whether the statute was violated.
The negligence per se theory thus operates much like a
"conclusive presumption," which is a rule of substantive law
rather than a procedural device intended to apportion the
burdens of production and persuasion.'8 The factual accuracy
of the thing presumed ("negligence") is not of concern. In-
deed, it is immaterial.9 Proof of defendant's statutory viola-
tion may not technically shift to defendant the burden of per-
suasion on the negligence issue, but it actually accomplishes a
great deal more. Defendant's only hope on the duty and
breach questions is to demonstrate that the statute does not
establish a standard of care, that she did not violate it, or that
her violation should be excused. However, strict adherence to
the theory underlying negligence per se should require that
excuses be very limited, and because the statutes involved in
91. Thayer, supra note 1, at 322. See James, supra note 1, at 106, who charac-
terizes this position as follows:
The most widely accepted rationalization of the negligence per se rule is
that given by Thayer. The civil action (according to this) cannot be re-
garded as one upon the statute for the statute gives no civil remedy. Any
recovery for breach of statute must be worked out on common law prin-
ciples of negligence.
See also Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 104-05, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (1889).
92. Adoption of the statutory standard can have an extreme effect upon the
common law of negligence, particularly if the statute replaces a specific no-duty rule
with a duty to take particular action. Perhaps this is what moved Thayer to suggest
that when a criminal statute imposes an obligation of affirmative action where the
common law would not have required action, civil liability could not result. Thayer,
supra note 1, at 329. Fleming has taken the same position. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
ToaTs 130 (3d ed. 1965). But if the theory of negligence per se is based on deference
to the legislature as the final arbiter of rules of conduct when it chooses to legislate,
there is no reason why a court should not be just as bound to follow the legislature in
these cases as in all others. See supra text accompanying note 33.
93. 9 J. WIGmoRE, supra note 66, § 2492, at 307-08.
94. Wigmore states:
Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in
the sense that the .opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by
any evidence that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really pro-
viding that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second fact's exis-
tence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent's case ....
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
these cases are typically strict liability offenses, 95 the range of
available excuses will be extremely narrow." This means that
evidence of circumstances which go beyond the issue of per-
missible excuses and actual violation of the statutory standard
is actually irrelevant, and should not be admitted by the
court.07 The jury should therefore not even be permitted to
hear much of the evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the violation of the statute, evidence which is permitted, and
often indeed required, under the other theories.
The negligence per se theory has been adopted in most
American jurisdictions. 8 While those who adhere to the the-
ory assert that their approach does not work a dramatic trans-
formation of the negligence action,99 an examination of the
implications of the theory demonstrates that its true effect is
to drastically alter the nature of the action and to introduce
rigid, unproductive elements into the adjudication of negli-
gence cases. The next section of the article will explore this
question in detail.
III. RATIONALE FOR REJECTION OF THE NEGLIGENCE PER SE
THEORY
A. The Rise of Negligence Doctrine; The Need for a Flexi-
ble Standard
The shift to a negligence standard in the middle of the
nineteenth century 00 represented both a departure from
95. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 164-220 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
98. See W. PROSSER, supra note 48, § 36, at 200 (stating that "the great major-
ity of the courts hold that an unexcused violation is conclusive on the issue of negli-
gence... ... "); James, supra note 1, at 106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286
(1965) has also adopted the negligence per se approach for situations in which a stat-
ute is found to set a standard of care. That section states that the court "may adopt
as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative en-
actment or an administrative regulation . . . ." (emphasis added). Because of the
permissive nature of this provision, it would appear that the court has the power to
refuse to apply even a statute which meets the test of setting a standard of care. The
comment following the section seems to support this interpretation.
99. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
100. "The new principle, basing liability for unintentionally caused harm on
proof of fault or negligence, became generally accepted around the middle of the




archaic distinctions between forms of action and a normative
shift in the manner of judging the character of an actor's con-
duct.10 1 Whereas in those cases which had previously fallen
under the "trespass" rubric, plaintiff had needed only to
demonstrate that defendant acted to directly cause him harm
(regardless of the reasonableness of the action),0 2 a singular
kind of judgment was now to be applied to all unintention-
ally-caused harm.103 Thenceforth, plaintiff could not recover
unless he could demonstrate that defendant owed him some
duty of care, and that under all the circumstances of the case,
defendant did not act toward plaintiff as the "reasonable per-
son" would have acted.'"
This new standard was well-suited to the service of social
goals of the late nineteenth century, a time when industrial
development was viewed as of paramount importance. No
doubt judges shared this goal, and sought to encourage indus-
trialization.1 0 5 They could see that new machinery, dangerous
101. For general discussions of the emergence of negligence as the primary basis
of tort liability, see id.; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7
HARv. L. REV. 315, 441, 453 (1894).
102. For a classic debate about the distinction between "immediate" and "con-
sequential" harms, see Scott v. Shepard, 2 Black. W. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
103. Recently, however, there has been some criticism of the notion that abso-
lute liability was the rule in actions brought under the writ of trespass, while actions
brought under the "case" writ were decided on a negligence theory. See, e.g., M. HOE-
wITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780 To 1860 at 89-91 (1977).
104. The case most often cited as having speeded this trend was Brown v.
Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), in which, for all intents and purposes, the
Massachusetts high court removed the distinction in pleading between those cases in
which harm had occurred "directly" and those in which it had come about in an
"indirect" manner. Whether the case would formerly have been required to be pled in
trespass or in trespass on the case, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate negligence
on defendant's part before he could recover.
105. The importance of this goal is perhaps nowhere made more explicit than in
the following passage from the New York Court of Appeals decision in Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484-85 (1873). In rejecting plaintiff's argument for the impo-
sition of strict liability in blasting cases, based on the English decision in Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868), the court said:
We must have factories, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded
by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civili-
zation. If I have any of these upon my lands, and they are not a nui-
sance and are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsible
for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He
receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in which
he shares, and the right which he has to place the same things upon his
lands.
Of course, there were also counter-trends occurring at the same time, in which liabil-
ity was expanded over what it would have been prior to the emergence of negligence
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in its operation, was needed for the task, and that an inevita-
ble consequence of rapid industrialization was physical harm
to innocent persons. Judges believed that industries were deli-
cate entrepreneurial enterprises, and that liability rules which
imposed responsibility in too many cases could impede or
even stop national progress toward full development. Thus,
rules which would give rise to more limited liability had to be
found, and the negligence standard was embraced.'"
Though the desire to limit liability can perhaps best be
illustrated in cases of railroad accidents, 7 the policy of en-
couraging action and enterprise applied to all activity, and
Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts may well have had this policy in mind when he de-
clared in Brown v. Kendall'0 that for all unintentional harms,
there could be no liability in the absence of negligence, and
that plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the negligence
issue.10'
theory. See Gregory, supra note 100, at 374-75.
106. The negligence standard, of course, provides greater protection to defen-
dants than one which does not require proof of "fault" in order for a harmed party to
recover. Moreover, given that plaintiff would bear the burden of proving defendant's
negligence, the barriers to recovery can be even greater. See infra note 109 and ac-
companying text.
107. See, e.g., Hauser v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 205 Iowa 940, 219 N.W. 60
(1928). There, a woman was "frightfully injured" when she apparently fainted in the
bathroom of a train and was burned by exposed steam pipes running along the floor
around three sides of the room. Reversing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
court stated:
It is quite apparent from the construction of this compartment that the
part thereof under the water cooler and wash basin was not intended for
the use of passengers. There was nothing below these basins of interest
to the passenger or put there for his use or accommodation, or for any
purpose directly affecting him. The company, in construction of this
compartment, was required, under a high degree of care, to construct it
with reference to the purposes of its intended use and with reference to
prudent and careful use thereof by its passengers.
Id. at 944-45, 219 N.W. at 62. Even if it was true, as the court stated, that the possi-
bility of a person fainting in the bathroom and falling against the pipes was small, it
is extremely unlikely that an appellate court today would reverse a jury verdict in the
plaintiff's favor, particularly given the small cost to the railroad of covering the steam
pipes. See also Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) (stating a minor-
ity rule imposing strict limits on recovery from railroad companies for fires caused by
engines).
108. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
109. Id. at 297. Chief Justice Shaw did not make his reasoning clear on this
issue, and indeed treated the problem as though the law had never distinguished be-
tween recovery in cases of direct harm and those of indirect harm. Id. See Gregory,
supra note 100, at 366.
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
The beauty of the negligence standard is its flexibility. As
social needs change, the standard can accommodate itself to
new goals. In an era when courts felt the need to assure (or at
least not impede) industrial development, they could hold
that an enterprise had only a duty to adhere to the general
custom and practice of that industry in taking safety precau-
tions and otherwise conducting its business.110 By the 1930's,
however, social goals had shifted, and courts were no longer
willing to protect enterprise at such a high cost in personal
injury. Thus, the old rule gave way to a flexible standard in
which industry custom would be but one factor in determining
the care owed in a given case."'
The flexibility of the negligence standard actually serves
important functions for both judge and jury."" First, it per-
mits the judge to control the question of whether any duty is
owed in a given case."13 Second, because of the basic general-
ity and circumstantial orientation of the formula "reasonable
care under all the circumstances," the jury is given wide lati-
tude in determining whether the duty of care has been satis-
fied in that case. Each aspect of this flexibility merits further
elaboration.
First, the standard grants the trial judge great flexibility
in determining whether a duty of care is owed in the case
before him. This decision can often be a complex one. Leon
Green identified five factors which a judge should always con-
sider: (1) an administrative factor (the workability of the
110. Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R.R., 136 Pa. 618, 20 A. 517 (1890). There, the
court called industry custom the "unbending test of negligence .... Id. at 626, 20
A. at 518.
111. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
112. The judicial process in negligence cases is not greatly dissimilar
from the judicial process in other cases. But negligence cases have af-
forded the process its greatest flexibility. It is extensive in these cases
because of the machinery required in making use of a jury, and more so
because negligence cases concern more largely the infinite variety of
workaday contacts involved in the operation and development of the
machine of industry and commerce. The judicial process in negligence
cases is the experimental machinery of government-by-judges through
which a restless and changing industrial society is furnished protection
against its self-inflicted physical hurts.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (II), 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 279(1929), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW: No PLACE TO
STOP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW (2d ed. 1977) at 209.
113. Responsibility to make such a determination clearly resides with the judge.
See supra note 17.
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rule); (2) an ethical or moral factor (the society's perspectives
on the nature of the parties' conduct); (3) an economic factor;
(4) a prophylactic or preventive factor; and (5) a justice factor
(inquiring which party has the greater capacity to bear the
loss).114 Learned Hand spoke mainly of economic considera-
tions (the probability of the harm coming about, the gravity
of that harm, and the burden of taking adequate precautions
to prevent the harm from occurring),115 though he later stated
that his formula probably assumed too much about the ability
to quantify certain matters.11 Others have offered different
explanations for when a duty arises in negligence cases.17 No
matter how the factors are identified, however, it is clear that
only if the judge has the power to determine the duty ques-
tion in each case can the factors receive appropriate treat-
ment. And by definition, any methodology which prevents the
judge from exercising this responsibility will lead, at best, to a
generalized weighing of factors that will often be unfair in its
application to individual cases.
The fact that the process of determining duty does not
succeed in the context of abstract situations has proven true
through historical experience. Most attempts at developing
concrete, specific definitions of duty applicable to "classes" of
"recurring" cases have failed, even though such attempts were
encouraged by such influential figures as Holmes.118 Indeed,
Holmes himself was to fall victim to the trap of believing that
"fixed and uniform standards of external conduct"'19 could be
114. Green, supra note 17; Green, supra note 112.
115. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), Hand
spoke of a duty arising if the burden of taking adequate precautions to prevent the
harm from occurring was less than the product of the probability of the particular
harm coming about multiplied times the gravity of that harm. The degree to which
this formula is economic in orientation is discussed in Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32-33 (1972).
116. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
117. George Fletcher suggests that the results of negligence cases can also be
explained according to a "paradigm of reciprocity," which would impose the burden
of the loss on a party whose conduct has subjected the other party to an unusual and
non-reciprocal degree of risk. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HAiv. L. REv. 537 (1972). Despite his claim that this paradigm better explains the
results of tort cases than .the "paradigm of reasonableness," it is nevertheless true
that whatever theory is employed to explain negligence cases, part of the determina-
tion of a case requires an evaluation of the nature of the risks involved in the parties'
conduct.




developed to settle the duty question for classes of cases. In
1927, he wrote the now familiar Supreme Court opinion Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman.12 0 It is hard to imagine a class
of cases more uniform and recurring than those involving rail-
road crossings, and it must have seemed to Holmes a rela-
tively easy matter to create a clear standard which would dic-
tate the precise precautions all drivers should take when
approaching such crossings.12 1 Yet that standard could not
survive, because railroad crossing accidents, like all other gen-
eralized fact patterns, actually occur in an infinite variety of
ways. It is no more possible to speak of a "recurring" kind of
crossing accident than it is to speak of a recurring slip-and-
fall fact pattern. Just seven years later, the Court "limited"
the Goodman rule in Pokora v. Wabash Ry.112 Justice Car-
dozo's opinion in that case recognized the fallacy of Holmes'
view, and warned of the "need for caution in framing stan-
dards of behavior that amount to rules of law. '1 28
It is important to see that it was not just the particular
rule which Holmes promulgated in Goodman which did not
work, but the idea itself that "fixed and uniform standards of
external conduct" can truly be developed to govern the infi-
nite variations which can arise in even the most similar-ap-
pearing of negligence cases. Much flexibility is needed in each
case for the court to determine whether, under the precise cir-
cumstances, a duty of care is owed, and whether it is appro-
priate to frame that duty more specifically than with the gen-
eral reasonableness formula.
In at least one way, the old rule about industry custom 1 24
also illustrates the poverty of fixed standards. While that rule
served an important social goal,12 5 its application was bound
to be improper in at least some individual cases. Faced with
such a rule, however, trial courts were prevented from taking
120. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
121. The standard in essence provided that a driver approaching a railroad
crossing should get out of his car and look to see if a train is approaching. However, itis interesting to note that even this rule was not stated with total inflexibility.
Holmes provided that the driver should get out of his car if he "cannot be sure other-
wise whether a train is dangerously near. . . " and that "he will not often be re-
quired to do more than to stop and look." Id. at 70.
122. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
123. Id. at 105.
124. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
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into consideration factors other than industry custom in fram-
ing the duty question. And as with Holmes' Goodman rule,
the old custom rule also eventually collapsed.
Time and again, then, courts have returned to a genera-
lized statement of the duty of care, not substantially different
from the 1837 formulation requiring "in all cases a regard to
caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe."12
The second area of flexibility afforded by the negligence
standard is the degree of freedom it grants to jurors to weigh
all circumstances in deciding whether reasonable care was in
fact exercised in the particular case. In a railroad crossing
case, the jurors can determine whether the circumstances
truly warranted exiting the car and walking up to the tracks,
or whether some lesser precaution would be sufficient. 127 But
the more specific the standard about which the judge instructs
the jury, the less room there will be to make this
determination.
Judge and jury are thus the essential element in each
case, and are of "greater importance than rules and formu-
las."1128 Their interrelated workings, with each serving a cir-
cumscribed yet highly situational function, assures not only
that justice is done between the parties, but that other fac-
tors, including important social policies, are served in each
126. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 475, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.
1837). Irvin Rutter has suggested that all legal rules are in fact general in nature, and
cannot operate unless this is so:
[A]II rules of law are generalizations . . . . [R]ules do not describe the
unique facts of a particular case, but a whole class of cases. As Oliphant
puts it, the rule must extend to at least one case other than that before
the court . . . . Unless it is so generalized, it cannot function as a rule.
The facts of a particular case are unique and unrepeatable, and a
description limited to that case will never find another case that it fits.
Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First Year Law Curriculum, 37 U. Cm. L. Rv.
9, 85 (1968).
127. In Pokora, 292 U.S. at 105, Cardozo listed some of the many facts which
would need to be considered in determining whether one should get out of the car
and look down the tracks, even if the roadbed is level and straight:
Where was Pokora to leave his truck after getting out to reconnoitre? If
he was to leave it on the switch, there was the possibility that the box
cars would be shunted down upon him before he could regain his seat
... . If he was to leave his vehicle near the curb, there was even
stronger reason to believe that the space to be covered in going back and
forth would make his observations worthless.
128. L. GREEN, supra note 112, at 210.
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case. No fixed rules can have this effect, and attempts to in-ject such standardized calculations into negligence law, no
matter whether they are born of the efforts of judges or of the
legislature, are doomed to failure. '" A crucial flaw in the neg-
ligence per se formula is that it requires just such an injection
of fixed standards into the adjudication of negligence cases.
There are other aspects of the judicial process, as well as
of the operation of legislatures, which help to explain the par-
ticular problem of injecting legislatively-derived standards
into negligence cases. That will be the subject of the next sec-
tion of the article.
B. Judicial Process Contrasted with Legislative Process:
Why Legislation Cannot Be Applied Per Se to Negligence
Cases
To this point, the article has focused primarily on the
process by which the common law works. More understanding
of the process of adjudicating cases, and how it contrasts with
the operation of legislatures and the nature of statutory rules,
is required in order to understand the weaknesses of the negli-
gence per se theory. This section will demonstrate that negli-
gence per se requires accepting into the common law process a
set of standards too narrow and unreliable to work effectively
in the adjudication of negligence cases.
The common law process operates through the applica-
tion of a constantly evolving general principle to a set of facts.
In each negligence case, judge and jury thus begin with two
things. The first is a set of facts, which it is the responsibility
of the jurors to determine. The second is a general legal prin-
ciple (that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of due care under
the circumstances). The judge has the responsibility to deter-
mine the suitability of that principle to the case, and to in-
struct the jury about the test to which it must subject the
129. To illustrate the need for flexibility in the negligence standard, Green
draws the example of the development of master-servant rules. As strict limitations
on the liability of the master, these rules could not meet the desires and needs of
society, and they changed in part through a process of jury decisions representing an
unwillingness to adhere to the established limitations. While Green felt that the bet-
ter way to bring about the change would have been for judges themselves to meet
their responsibility to change rules which no longer made sense, he nevertheless
would claim that it is the nature of the adjudicatory process in negligence cases -
making extensive use of both judge and jury - which eventually brought about the
fall of rules which did not meet the society's needs. Id. at 198-99.
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facts. As has already been shown, ' both judge and jury must
engage in a complex weighing process in order to determine,
respectively, the scope of any duty owed, and whether that
duty was breached. Most often, the judge's weighing process
will result in the conclusion that the duty of care should be
expressed generally, and the jury will be instructed accord-
ingly. But until a given factual situation is decided by a court
in this manner, there cannot be said to be any "rule" which
characterizes the parties' conduct as negligent or not. Harlan
Stone may have had this in mind when he declared almost
fifty years ago:
With the common law, unlike its civil law and its Roman
law precursor, the formulation of general principles has
not preceded decision. Its origin is the law of the practi-
tioner rather than the philosopher. Decision has drawn its
inspiration and its strength from the very facts which
frame the issue for decision. General rules, underlying
principles, and finally legal doctrine, have successively
emerged only as the precedents, accumulated through the
centuries, have been seen to follow a pattern. .... 131
Stone's point is not that common law adjudication oper-
ates without a set of principles which can be applied to the
cases. Rather, the point is that the interplay between fact and
principle is so close that the principle really has no meaning
outside the factual context. Thus, there is no "rule" in isola-
tion from a particular set of facts. "Law" evolves through an
incremental process, and it is only over time that the general
principle takes on meaning as patterns emerge from the de-
cided cases. There will, of course, be aberrant decisions, and
these will either be woven into the fabric of the law (giving
the principle new meaning) or swallowed up amid a large
number of contrary, though factually similar, decisions.""
This never-ceasing process operates without the direct in-
fluence of political factors, and with no significant public re-
130. See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
131. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6
(1936).
132. The analogy to biological evolution is intended, though its application is
far from perfect and it is not meant to apply in an all-encompassing sense. This is not
an explanation of how societal change occurs; it is a recognition that in the develop-




course. It is the reasoning process alone which should justify
decisions reached in particular cases, and not any physical or
political power base which the parties or the court might
bring to bear.13 Therefore, in any particular case the court,
especially on appeal, must justify its decision not in terms of
whether it accords with the views of a majority of people in
the society, or even with the pressures exerted by powerful
forces representing the interests of the parties, but only in
terms of whether the decision is a proper application of legal
principle to the facts.13 4
The common law process also permits constant updating
of the law.' 8 When it either appears that society no longer
benefits from a particular principle, or that a specific rule no
longer accords with a more generally accepted principle, there
is flexibility within which to order change in the system.
Though such change does not appear incremental when it
suddenly occurs in an individual case, the process is not really
sudden. A look at jury verdicts or results in reported decisions
will more often reveal that over a fairly lengthy period, courts
have not strictly abided by the supposed rule, and have
moved in another direction to the extent the rule could toler-
133. Traynor, supra note 2, at 402, citing Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 749, 772 (1965).
134. This does not mean that the wishes or goals of society do not play a part in
the determination of either the duty owed in negligence cases or whether the stan-
dard of care has been violated. It has already been explained that the very nature of
the common law process allows for and thrives on the consideration of such factors.
See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text. What is meant here is that the adju-
dicatory process operates without the direct influence of political factors, including
the need for majority support of its members in order for them to continue in their
roles as judges and jurors. Moreover, there is no public recourse (aside from removal
of a judge, which is exceedingly rare) for decisions which do not comport with major-
ity support, aside from appeal to the legislature to impose different rules on the
courts. Rather than operating with the direct majoritarian pressures of a legislature,
courts function through this evolutionary process, permitting them to gradually bring
about change in law where the need for change is perceived.
135. "The incremental nature of common law adjudication meant that no singlejudge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over
time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people." G.
CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 4.
With social change comes the imperative demand that law satisfy the
needs which change has created, and so the problem . . . of jurispru-
dence in the modern world is the reconciliation of the demands, para-
doxical and to some extent conflicting, that law shall at once have con-
tinuity with the past and adaptability to the present and the future.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 6, 11 (1936).
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ate.181 Only when it is not possible to go any further without
explicitly rejecting the rule do courts abandon it once and for
all. An example is the judicial rejection of contributory negli-
gence in some jurisdictions. While it may appear that the con-
tributory negligence doctrine is officially swept away by a sin-
gle opinion,18 7 that is hardly true in practice, because even
under a strict rule of contributory negligence, both judges and
juries typically administer that rule as though comparative
negligence were the standard.188 Interestingly, when it rejected
the contributory negligence rule in favor of pure comparative
negligence, the California court changed not only a prior com-
mon law rule, but also a statute which had codified that
rule.139 The court reasoned that since the contributory negli-
gence rule was originally a creation of the common law, it
could also be abrogated by the common law process.
1 40
The common law process of incremental development of
legal doctrine through application of evolving, general princi-
ples contrasts with the function and operation of the legisla-
ture. The complexity of the political process makes a precise
formulation of the legislative method extremely difficult."'
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain attributes of leg-
islative operation which demonstrate why the pronounce-
ments which emerge cannot be accepted wholesale into the
common law system of adjudicating disputes.
136. See supra note 129.
137. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
138. This was observed as long ago as 1933, when Ulman stated: "For many
years juries have been deciding cases as though there was no such rule of law." J.
ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND (1933). See also Keeton, Creative Continuity in
the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 508 (1962) ("The change to comparative
negligence would in its nature produce little stress on the principle of continuity in
view of the existing unlegitimated practice of juries in applying a rough rule of this
type."); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of
the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 833 (1961).
139. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
140. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813-23, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232-39, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 864-71 (1975). Traynor argued that the courts have the responsibility
for the upkeep of the common law, even if it means rejecting a judicially created rule
which has been codified by the legislature. Traynor, supra note 2, at 414-15, referring
to People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964), in which
such action was taken by the court.
141. Characterizing the legislative process is a difficult task, and it is probably
true that no one system pervades that process. The discussion in the text is merely an
attempt to identify certain fairly discernable aspects of that process, not an attempt
to fully categorize it.
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It has already been pointed out that the legitimate judi-
cial rationale for looking to criminal statutes in negligence
cases is a desire to help promote the policy underlying that
legislation. 142 However, there can often be serious doubt about
the policy of statutes which emerge from the legislative pro-
cess.14 This problem stems from the political nature of that
system, which requires legislators to be responsive to shifting
majorities or coalitions of minorities.14 4 The result is often in-
stability in policy-making and periodic reversal of direction.
Even the briefest look at the number of roadblocks to passage
of a piece of legislation suggests that the chance of a legisla-
tive proposal surviving intact, either in form or in purpose, is
slim at best.14 5 Moreover, legislation designed to relieve a par-
ticular problem often becomes outdated over time. Political
realities, however, often make such legislation impossible to
repeal, even when a majority of the legislators would no longer
support the legislation were it now being proposed for the first
time. 1, 6
Therefore it may be true that even if there existed a
fairly coherent legislative purpose at the time a statute was
142. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
143. Referring to the roadblock to passage posed by the committee structure in
legislatures, Traynor said:
For all the vaunted responsiveness of legislatures to the will of the peo-
ple, it is no secret that legislative committees, particularly those domi-
nated by the elder statesmen of a seniority system, tend to dilute the
reliability of statutes as an expression of public policy. Hence it is [no]
small wonder that statutes are often bad and indifferent as well as good.
Traynor, supra note 2, at 424-25 (footnotes omitted).
144. "As finally enacted by a multi-membered and often two-bodied legislature,
[a law] may represent an amalgam of perceptions and of compromises influenced by
the views of affected special interests, and therefore, it is sometimes not internally
consistent." Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 7 S.U.L. Rv. 147, 148 (1981). See also G. CALABRwsi, supra note 2, at 3, 185 n.9.
145. The number of roadblocks to the final passage of legislation range from
various forms of committees (standing committees, sub-committees, conference com-
mittees, etc.) to floor battles, and executive vetoes. See supra note 143. See generally
Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, 92
POL. ScI. Q. 1 (1977).
146. Gilmore wrote that "[o]ne of the facts of legislative life, at least in this
country in this century, is that getting a statute enacted in the first place is much
easier than getting the statute revised so that it will make sense in the light of
changed conditions." G. GILMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977). See also G.
CALABRESi, supra note 2, at 8 (concerning the fact that the Connecticut birth control
law finally held unconstitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
would not have been possible to pass by that time, but was also politically impossible
to repeal).
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adopted, that purpose may no longer exist at a future date
when the statutory standard is hauled before a court in a neg-
ligence case. In such a situation, a court wishing to enforce the
legislative will is operating in a legal vacuum, even granted its
highly developed skill of statutory interpretation. 147 And if the
legislative policy is so often incoherent or simply nonexistent
as a unitary truth, then any judicial doctrine which requires
blind adherence to a statutory standard of conduct should be
immediately suspect. Negligence per se is just such a doctrine,
since it requires that once a court finds that a statute estab-
lishes a standard of care,'s the court must adopt that statute
in place of the common law duty of care which would other-
wise have been applicable to the case.' 4 '
Further, suppose that a court adhering to the negligence
per se doctrine is somehow able to determine what the current
legislative policy would be were the statute to come before the
legislature today,1 50 and to alter the meaning of the rule ac-
cordingly. If the court engages in this rather risky pursuit, its
changing application of the statute will substantially sacrifice
the values of predictability, consistency, and gradual evolution
of negligence doctrine. Stare decisis, so much a part of the
operation of the common law, will be subsumed in the court's
attempts to adhere to a shifting legislative will. Moreover, one
inflexible standard will be substituted by another, albeit up-
dated, one. The court's pursuit of elusive legislative policy will
thus be of little benefit, and will indeed sacrifice much more
than will be gained.
The nature of the "rule" which emerges from the legisla-
tive process provides another reason why per se acceptance
into the common law system will not succeed. By their nature,
statutes are narrow, concrete standards of conduct. (Indeed,
criminal statutes must be narrowly drawn in order to survive
constitutional attack). 1 Because of this narrow quality, the
147. The subterfuge often involved in the statutory interpretation process has
already been discussed. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
150. Absent some act such as recent amendment of the statute, it is hard to
imagine how a court would be able to determine the current intent of the legislature.
Conceivably, this could be done by looking at recent legislative action in similar or
analogous areas of law, but this would be an uncertain and risky enterprise.
151. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), in which the
United States Supreme Court declared certain vagrancy ordinances "void for vague-
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same problems emerge in application as are involved when a
court attempts to prescribe a duty in terms of "fixed and uni-
form standards of external conduct."1 2 The standard simply
cannot be applied without sometimes reaching results which
are not fair under the circumstances.
An illustration will make this point more clear. Suppose
that a legislator has become aware of the number of pedes-
trian deaths resulting from collisions between automobiles
and pedestrians who walk in the direction of rather than fac-
ing traffic.158 Based on an observation of this phenomenon,
the legislator might propose a law which makes it illegal for a
pedestrian to walk in the same direction as the traffic on that
side of the street. The legislator's view of this problem is nec-
essarily a prospective one. Unlike a court, which will have a
specific case before it involving a set of unique facts, the legis-
lator will have before him either a generalized view of a kind
of problem, or his own conception of a very narrow fact situa-
tion. In either case, however, the legislator's task, quite dis-
tinct from that of a court, is to attempt to cover a certain
category of conduct with a written rule, typically framed in
narrow terms. It may not (and because of its prospective na-
ture often cannot) account for particular situations in which
pedestrian safety might be better served by walking with the
traffic.'" Indeed, the legislator might not even have consid-
ered this possibility.' 6" In a criminal prosecution brought
against a pedestrian who violated the statute, the entirety of
the conduct, and perhaps state of mind, will probably play a
role in determining guilt.' 5" However, if a court accepts the
criminal statute in a negligence action as establishing a per se
ness" and thus violative of the due process clause. The Court declared that a statute
will be declared void for vagueness if it "'fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute ... [and
when] it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.'" 405 U.S. at 162(quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
152. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 257.665 (1977) (a Michigan statute aimed atthis problem and applied in Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270(1976)); Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1156 (1929) (a former New York statute involvedin Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939) and now codified as N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1156 (McKinney 1970)).
154. This was the problem raised in Zeni and Tedla.
155. Morris, supra note 1, at 29.
156. This will not be true, however, if the crime involved is a strict liability
offense. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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standard of conduct, a party may be found negligent in a situ-
ation not even envisioned by the legislature.15
Legislative standards also have an immutable character
which makes their fit into the common law system especially
difficult, probably even more so than the kinds of fixed stan-
dards which Holmes urged judges to adopt. Particularly in the
appellate context where such rules are likely to be made,
judges must support their positions with written opinions ex-
plaining their rationale. The "rule," even if a supposedly fixed
standard, thus stands in the midst of at least some explana-
tion which has been agreed upon by all signatories to the
opinion. In subsequent cases where a particular decision may
be relevant, the litigants therefore have a great deal more to
go on than the "fixed" standard. Indeed, the language of the
opinion will often leave room to argue that the fixed standard
was not intended to be applied to the case now before the
court. 15 8 The limits of the rule are probed in this manner, and
the rule takes on a gradually evolving meaning. "Fixed and
uniform standards," in the judicial context, are therefore illu-
sory even if judges claim to promulgate them.
The same cannot generally be said for legislation. Be-
157. Sometimes legislators will not know how particular legislation will fit into
the fabric of the law, and will say so explicitly. An interesting example is provided by
A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). During those hearings, which concerned a portion of the
1964 Civil Rights Act pertaining to discrimination in places of public accommodation
(Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, now renumbered 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6), a ques-
tion came up about whether the legislation could be authorized under the commerce
clause of the Constitution. In a very revealing statement about his view of the legisla-
tive process and its relation to the function of courts, Senator Magnuson, Chairman
of the Committee, said:
I think we ought to get this in perspective.
Congress doesn't determine what is under the interstate commerce
clause. The Constitution and court decisions determine that .... We
are talking about how far you want to go or what you want to do in a
particular field with a bill .... Whether a business is in interstate
commerce or not is a question of the interpretation of the Constitution
and of the courts' rules in these matters.
Id. at 71. Later, both Assistant Attorney General Marshall and James J. Kilpatrick, a
journalist, took a different position, arguing, in the words of Mr. Marshall, "[ilt would
be a disservice to pass a bill that was later thrown out by the Supreme Court." Id. at
252.
158. Even in Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), for ex-
ample, Holmes left room to argue that it would not be necessary in some cases to get
out of the car and look down the tracks. See supra note 121.
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cause legislatures do not usually feel constrained to provide a
unitary rationale for their product, the result of legislative ef-
fort is often far more fixed and immutable than judicially-de-
veloped standards. Although courts must interpret statutes as
cases arise under them, the direct, brief form in which stat-
utes are drawn simply does not permit much flexibility. In ad-
dition, statutes are not usually subject to incremental change.
They remain in force until the political climate alters suffi-
ciently to amend or discard them. When the change does oc-
cur, it comes in hurried leaps rather than measured steps, and
this differs significantly from common law change.'
In sum, there are serious problems in meshing statutory
standards with the common law system in negligence cases.
Rather than having before it a still evolving concept of "due
care," a court is faced with bald language declaring particular
conduct to be a crime. That statute cannot be changed by the
court; it can either be adopted wholesale into the adjudicatory
process, it can be rejected as irrelevant, or it can be seen as
relevant on the question of the acceptability of certain con-
duct, but not without room for judicial judgment. If a court
chooses the first course, and adopts the legislative standard
per se, the court has frozen the common law at that point,
leaving no room for further change until the legislature acts to
change its rule. Perhaps the problem would not be so serious
if the negligence per se doctrine could tolerate broad excuses,
but .as will be shown,' 0 this is not the case.
Two final points need to be made here. First, one wonders
whether legislatures would object to courts' refusal to accept
criminal legislation as the absolute standard of conduct for
those negligence cases. Had the question of civil liability come
to the attention of the legislature, it could have made matters
clear by explicitly creating or refusing to create a civil rem-
edy.'61 But even apart from this, legislators are always aware
159. "[A] difference between the legislative rule and the judicially-evolved pre-
cept is that the latter, having resulted from judicial 'interpretation' rather than from
legislative command, may without theoretical difficulty be modified or overruled in
the light of a changed social milieu or an unforeseen factual aberration." Tate, The
Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U.L. REv. 147,
150 (1981). Tate sees this as permitting "greater judicial freedom in modifying judge-
made law. . . ." Id.
160. See infra notes 164-220 and accompanying text.
161. If the legislature takes this action, then the court has no choice but to
enforce the statute, unless some basis can be found either for holding it inapplicable
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that the rules they enact will have to be interpreted by courts
and applied to situations they have not envisioned, even in
those cases to which the legislation directly applies. It should
therefore be neither a shock nor an insult to the legislature
that courts do not adopt statutory standards wholesale in
cases to which the legislation does not explicitly apply.
A final and related point is that we should never lose
sight of the difference between the goals which legislatures
have in mind when enacting criminal legislation, and those
which courts seek to serve in deciding negligence cases. Con-
duct which a legislature might consider culpable enough to
make subject to criminal penalty is not necessarily conduct
which either a court or the legislature would wish to make
compensable. Wholly different considerations go into the de-
termination of whether society needs to be protected through
the use of criminal sanctions for certain conduct, and whether
that same conduct should be made subject to a civil action
brought by the harmed party. " '
In sum, neither the legislative process nor the underlying
purposes for which legislation is enacted demand that courts
adopt the negligence per se approach in civil cases. The adop-
tion of negligence per se in fact impedes the common law pro-
cess of doctrinal development and unproductively freezes the
characterization of conduct as reasonable or unreasonable.
Nevertheless, criminal legislation must be synchronized with
the common law,16 8 and the article will now turn to another
area in which the negligence per se formula creates problems
in achieving such synchrony.
C. The Problem of Excuses Under the Negligence Per Se
Theory
The preceding section addressed the reasons why the
or voiding it altogether.
162. This becomes particularly important when one considers that the civil lia-
bility arising out of negligence cases in which a criminal statute forms the basis of the
duty of care might be far greater than the criminal sanction for such conduct. The
process which gives rise to the criminal statute should therefore be carefully consid-
ered before that standard is adopted wholesale and "potentially ruinous civil liabil-
ity" imposed on one who has committed a minor criminal infraction. Morris, supra
note 1, at 23. See also James, supra note 1, at 107-08.
163. Overstating the point, Traynor wrote: "The hydraheaded problem is how
to synchronize the unguided missiles launched by legislatures with a going system of
common law." Traynor, supra note 2, at 402.
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static rules derived through the legislative process, if adopted
wholesale, do not provide courts with the flexibility to achieve
the gradual development of law which the proper administra-
tion of negligence cases requires. The discussion focused both
on the method by which statutes are adopted and on the na-
ture of statutory rules, and contrasted those elements with the
common law process of incremental change and the generality
of the standards most often found useful in negligence cases.
Fixed standards, it was argued, freeze the development of
negligence law and eliminate the fluidity of the system. Given
that flexibility in negligence law helps further important pub-
lic policy and best serves the infinite variety of negligence
cases, any theory which accepts statutory standards as conclu-
sive on the standard of care in negligence cases is seriously
flawed.
This section of the article will analyze the extent to which
the theory underlying negligence per se can tolerate the intro-
duction of excuses which cushion the harsh effects of the doc-
trine. The analysis will reveal that in order to adhere to the
policies underlying negligence per se, only the most limited
excuses can rationally be justified. However, a theory which
permits so few excuses leads to unfair and unduly harsh re-
sults in many cases.
Even the most ardent proponents of the negligence per se
doctrine would allow excuses which would be permissible in a
criminal prosecution based on the statute.164 If the doctrine
rests on a foundation of deference to the legislative will, to
hold otherwise would run contrary to the entire basis of the
theory by creating civil liability for conduct which would not
be found criminal. Therefore, if a criminal statute has been
construed to permit the broad excuse that under all the cir-
cumstances, it was proper to engage in the proscribed con-
duct,6 ' negligence per se theory should permit the same ex-
164. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 1, at 632.
165. An example of a statute which has been construed to permit a broad ex-
cuse in a criminal prosecution is CAL. VEH. CODE § 21650 (West 1971), which requires
that drivers use the right half of the roadway except under specified circumstances.
Though its language does not imply such an excuse, the statute has been construed to
permit a consideration of all the circumstances before a person will be found guilty
for its violation. Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co., 114 Cal. App. 85, 299
P. 749 (1931). If all circumstances will be considered before one will be found crimi-
nally responsible, the same should be true in a negligence action in which a party has
allegedly violated the statute, and the decisions bear this out. See Uhl v. Fertig, 56
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cuse in the negligence action. The theory has no difficulty
recognizing the excuse since it would be equally cognizable in
a criminal prosecution based on the statute.
The theory also should not have any difficulty limiting li-
ability when the statute invoked in the case requires intent in
order for a criminal prosecution to succeed. Suppose a crimi-
nal statute prohibits persons from knowingly operating un-
fenced construction sites. In the negligence case, the court
must first determine whether the statute sets a standard of
care.166 This will require asking what conduct the statute was
intended to prohibit. In this case, the answer would have to be
that the proscribed conduct was the knowing failure to fence
the construction site. The intent portion of the statute would
thus become a part of the standard of care applicable to the
negligence case, and if the criminal prosecution would not suc-
ceed because of lack of intent, neither would the negligence
action. 16 7 This is therefore another instance in which negli-
gence per se theory could limit liability in accordance with the
limitations on defendant's criminal responsibility."'
Can the negligence per se doctrine tolerate excuses be-
yond those which would be cognizable in a criminal prosecu-
tion based on the statute? As already indicated, 69 the pur-
pose of the negligence per se doctrine is to defer to and help
promote the legislature's policy judgment when it has implic-
itly established a standard of care by providing criminal pen-
alties for certain conduct. If that is the case, then a court's
Cal. App. 718, 206 P. 467 (1922) (defendant swerved left across the center line to
avoid plaintiff's car); and Lowe v. City of San Diego, 8 Cal. App. 2d 440, 47 P.2d 1083
(1935) (defendant crossed the center line to avoid hitting a child who had suddenly
come into his path).
166. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
167. It is conceivable that a court might construe the statute only as intended
to protect the public from the evil of unfenced construction sites. This more general
interpretation of the statute would have to be suspect, however, because the legisla-
ture in truth will not have determined that all persons who have unfenced construc-
tion sites are criminally responsible, but only those who knowingly fail to put up
fences. Were the court to construe the intent in this broader manner, it would be
providing for civil liability far more often than the statute creates criminal responsi-
bility. If the basis of negligence per se is deference to the will of the legislature, such
a result is clearly not called for.
168. This example is not technically one of excuse in either the criminal prose-
cution or the civil action. In the former, intent is an element of the prosecution's
prima facie case, and in the latter, intent will be plaintiff's burden to prove, since it
relates to the duty and breach elements of the prima facie case.
169. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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recognition of any excuses which would not be cognizable in
criminal prosecutions based on the statute should necessarily
be suspect because if such excuses are recognized, the court
will be failing to hold civilly liable some persons who have en-
gaged in the precise conduct addressed by the legislature. But
excuses in negligence cases should not be limited to those
which would be permitted in the criminal prosecution. To so
limit excuses would arguably alter the entire nature of the
negligence action, since many of the criminal statutes involved
in these cases do not contain any "scienter" or "mens rea"
requirement. 170 If no "fault" is required, with the only ques-
tion being whether the party did the proscribed act and was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, then the so-
called negligence case begins to look more like a strict liability
action. 17
For example, driving under the influence of alcohol is
often punished without regard to the intent of the defen-
dant.172 If an individual is prosecuted for driving under the
170. Thayer, supra note 1, at 335; Note, Nonfault Liability for Vehicle Equip-
ment Failures, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1112, 1127 (1971). See also Holdych, supra note 3, at
916.
171. It is interesting that the negligence per se doctrine has sometimes been
confused with strict liability. See Note, supra note 170. However, even given a strict
interpretation, the doctrine does not create liability without fault. Courts applying
the negligence per se doctrine may adopt a criminal standard under some notion that
they are compelled to do so out of deference to the legislature, but only do so after
deciding that the statute creates a standard of care the breach of which can be con-
sidered negligence. As Thayer asserted, such cases are still negligence cases. Thayer,
supra note 1, at 321-22. Presumably, defenses available in negligence cases could still
be asserted, and other doctrines applicable to negligence but not to strict liability
theory would similarly apply.
Nevertheless, the less fault that is required before one will be held liable, the
more these cases begin to look like strict liability cases, and perhaps this is what the
Michigan Supreme Court had in mind when it stated:
(Tihe judge-made rule of negligence per se has still proved to be too
inflexible and mechanical to satisfy thoughtful commentators and
judges. It is forcefully argued that no matter how a court may attempt
to confine the negligence per se doctrine, if defendant is liable despite
the exercise of due care and the availability of a reasonable excuse, this
is really strict liability, and not negligence.
Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 139, 243 N.W.2d 270, 281 (1976).
172. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982), replacing §
23102, which was similar in content. In People v. Keith, 184 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 884, 7
Cal. Rptr. 613 (1960), the older code section was construed as imposing liability with-
out regard to the innocence of the defendant in becoming intoxicated. See also Peo-
ple v. Baxter, 165 Cal. App. 2d 648, 332 P.2d 334 (1958), which spells out the ele-
ments of the offense solely in terms of acts, with no mention of scienter.
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influence, he cannot excuse himself by claiming that a sudden
emergency required him to drive. That excuse would not suc-
ceed because a legislative determination that this offense re-
quires no mens rea is a determination that to do the pro-
scribed act poses such a serious public danger that it will not
be permitted without criminal penalty, even where it might
otherwise be "reasonable" to engage in the conduct. 173 Sup-
pose, however, that following a two-car collision, the injured
driver brings a negligence action against the driver of the
other car. Suppose further that as a matter of common law
negligence, defendant was exercising due care in deciding to
drive since his child had suddenly become seriously ill and
there were no reasonable alternative means of obtaining medi-
cal assistance than to. drive him to the hospital. However,
plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent because he was
driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the stat-
ute. If defendant claims that he was only on the road because
of the sudden emergency, should plaintiff be permitted to re-
cover substantial damages by raising defendant's statutory vi-
olation? To be consistent with the legislative determination
concerning public safety, and to grant the degree of deference
to the legislative standard which negligence per se requires, it
would seem improper to allow the defendant to claim the ex-
cuse, since that excuse could not be used in a criminal prose-
173. See United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1349 (D.Md. 1978), and
United States v. Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.D.C. 1961), both of which declare
the act of driving under the influence to be so inherently dangerous as to be "malum
in se."
It is possible that in a criminal prosecution based on the statute, defendant could
raise the defense of necessity. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 50 (1972). One of the criteria for satisfying the defense is that under
the circumstances, the harm which would result from complying with the statute is
greater than that which results from noncompliance. Id. Determination of that issue
requires a balancing of harms which is normally up to judge and jury in the criminal
action. However, if the legislature has already weighed those factors and incorporated
them, explicitly or implicitly, into the statute, then the availability of the defense will
depend on the legislative judgment. On this basis, it is unclear whether necessity
could be a defense to a strict liability crime, since it may be that with such offenses,
the legislature has implicitly determined that the harm from noncompliance will al-
ways be greater than that from compliance.
In any event, if the necessity defense is available in the criminal prosecution, it
should be similarly available in the negligence action. And if this is true, cases which
have held that the statutory violator cannot be excused where he claims that his con-
duct was safer than that required by the statute are wrongly decided. See infra notes
192-94 and accompanying text.
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cution based on the statute.
But at the same time, something seems wrong with that
result. Although some deference must be shown to the legisla-
ture's policy of deterring driving while intoxicated, this is not
the only policy which a court might wish to consider in deter-
mining liability in a negligence case. For example, a court
might wish not only to discourage intoxicated persons from
driving, but also to encourage attempts to render needed as-
sistance to sick persons. 174 Yet, if negligence per se requires
that statutory standards be followed to the extent that only
those excuses be recognized which would be available in crimi-
nal actions, then the court deciding the negligence case would
have to rule defendant's evidence about the sick relative inad-
missible.175 Moreover, if defendant admits to being intoxi-
cated, the court will also be forced to direct a verdict for the
plaintiff on the issue of breach of the duty, making recovery a
near certainty.
The same untenable result would be mandated in a case
in which it is the plaintiff who has .violated the criminal stat-
ute. Suppose that a driver who knows her car's tail-lights are
not working nevertheless undertakes to drive her child to the
hospital in an emergency. If the statute imposes criminal re-
sponsibility without fault for driving a car without functioning
tail-lights, then negligence per se would require the refusal to
admit evidence of the excuse in a negligence action filed fol-
lowing an accident in which the plaintiff is injured by a negli-
gent defendant. In a jurisdiction which adheres to the all-or-
nothing contributory negligence rule, the court might even
feel compelled to take the case from the jury and direct a ver-
dict for defendant.17 6
Fortunately, even jurisdictions which otherwise adhere to
the doctrine of negligence per se have not interpreted it so
strictly as to refuse to permit an excuse in cases in which the
party is faced with a sudden emergency not of his own mak-
174. If as in the hypothetical, the driver were the parent of the sick child, the
law might even impose a duty to seek immediate assistance for the child.
175. The evidence would be inadmissible because it would not be relevant to
the action once the excuse which the conduct addressed was deemed inapplicable.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
176. The directed verdict might be called for because the violation itself is es-
tablished and plaintiff will have offered no evidence to support a cognizable excuse.
The violation will therefore be negligence.
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ing, even where the violator would be found criminally re-
sponsible.'77 Exactly why these jurisdictions have backed
away from what would arguably be the result mandated by
the negligence per se doctrine is a matter for speculation. Per-
haps these courts realize that a refusal to recognize some ex-
cuses in cases such as those we have just discussed would so
alter the negligence action as to render it in many ways the
equivalent of a strict liability case. 178 Nevertheless, if a crimi-
nal statute imposes responsibility without fault, courts decid-
ing negligence cases based on the statute are departing from
the basis of the theory when they permit excuses which would
not be available in criminal prosecutions. 17 9
177. Morris, supra note 1, at 32-33. However, in 1950 James wrote that some
states still required that the court be able to find an implied exception to the statute
in order to permit excuses to be recognized. James, supra note 1, at 117 n.74 (citing
McDowell v. Federal Tea Company, 129 Conn. 455, 23 A.2d 512 (1942), and Andrew
v. White Line Bus Corp., 115 Conn. 464, 161 A. 792 (1932)). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 288A(2)(d)(1965) would permit the emergency excuse. See Statutory Vio-
lation, supra note 3, at 557, noting recognition of the excuse.
It is not absolutely clear that the hypotheticals posed raise the traditional "sud-
den emergency" kind of case. The broad contours of that excuse are not clear. In
Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939), plaintiff and her brother were
walking on the right side of a highway in violation of a statute which required pedes-
trians to walk on the left side, facing oncoming traffic. They were struck by defen-
dant's vehicle. Facing the argument that plaintiff and her brother were contributorily
negligent per se, plaintiff argued that a custom which pre-dated the statute permitted
walking on the right when traffic coming from behind was much lighter than oncom-
ing traffic. A later New York case asserted that these facts involved an emergency
situation, a questionable construction. See Nielson v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d
592, 328 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1971).
More commonly, emergency cases involve situations such as that posed by the
Illustration to Clause (2)(d) of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A comment h,
illustration 5 (1965). In that Illustration, a driver violates a criminal statute by cross-
ing the center line of a highway, but only when a child suddenly darts out from the
sidewalk into the driver's path. For a similar fact pattern, see Lowe v. City of San
Diego, 8 Cal. App. 2d 440, 47 P.2d 1083 (1935). However, in another case a park
officer crossed the center line of a road to avoid pedestrians because he was in a hurry
to reach another part of the park to break up a fight. The court held that the facts
did not raise the "sudden emergency" excuse. Poplawski v. Huron Clinton Metropoli-
tan Auth., 78 Mich. App. 644, 653, 260 N.W.2d 890, 895 (1977). Although that case
(and the hypotheticals posed in the text) do not fit the classic "sudden emergency"
fact pattern, they are at least somewhat similar, since in all the cases, the violator was
acting in what he considered an emergency situation. The difference is that the emer-
gency was not on the road itself.
178. Morris, supra note 1, at 32. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
179. In one South Carolina decision, the court went so far as to say that a party
is bound to violate a statute in an emergency situation if to do so will avoid inflicting
injury. Walker v. Lee, 115 S.C. 495, 106 S.E. 682 (1921). Plaintiff collided with defen-
dant when he stayed on his side of the center line of the highway, in compliance with
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The emergency excuse is compelling in a negligence case
because it carries with it an element of involuntariness or
non-fault on the part of the violator. Negligence per se juris-
dictions have adopted other excuses which contain that same
element. Persons have been excused when they are able to
demonstrate that compliance with the statute would have
been impossible,180 when noncompliance was caused by cir-
cumstances over which the violator had no control,"8 or when
the violator neither knew nor should have known of the occa-
sion for compliance. 8 In each of these cases, the actor is ex-
cused because he or she cannot be held at fault for violating
the statute. It is easy to see how even courts adhering to negli-
gence per se would find it difficult to hold these parties re-
sponsible. But that result would be mandated by the theory if
the statutes would not permit the excuses in criminal
prosecutions.""5
Negligence per se theory has even greater difficulty ac-
commodating excuses beyond the kinds already discussed, and
could lead to other unjust results if strictly followed. A good
example is provided by the facts of Zeni v. Anderson.'" On a
winter morning in the upper Michigan peninsula, the plaintiff,
a nurse, was walking to work. A state statute required that
when sidewalks are provided, it is unlawful to walk on the
main traveled portion of the highway. It also provided that
when there are no sidewalks, a pedestrian must, when practi-
cable, walk on the left side of the highway, facing traffic.88
a statute. The court, however, was unwilling to say that he was free of contributory
negligence for complying with the statute. He should have avoided the collision by
swerving to the left. See Note, Negligence Per Se in South Carolina: The Effect
Given in Civil Actions for the Violation of Criminal Statutes, 11 S.C.L. Q. 207, 211-
12 (1959).
180. See Statutory Violation, supra note 3, at 557; James, supra note 1, at 117;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965) takes the same position.
181. James, supra note 1, at 117. This excuse may overlap with the "sudden
emergency" excuse. See supra note 177.
182. Statutory Violation, supra note 3, at 557-58; Statutory Excuse, supra note
3, at 109-10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A(2)(b)(1965) would also allow
the excuse.
183. As already noted, not all such statutes impose criminal responsibility with-
out fault, and where they do not, there are no theoretical difficulties in a negligence
per se jurisdiction recognizing such excuses. See supra notes 166-68 and accompany-
ing text.
184. 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270 (1976). A similar, and much discussed, de-
cision is Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
185. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 257.655 (1977).
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Because the sidewalk was snow-covered, and because compli-
ance with the statute would have required her to walk across
the street twice to get to her job, plaintiff chose instead to
walk on the right side of the highway, along a "well-used pe-
destrian snowpath, with her back to oncoming traffic."' 5
While walking, plaintiff was struck by the right-hand (passen-
ger) side of a car driven by defendant, and was seriously in-
jured. Testimony at trial was also offered to prove that it was
common for nurses to reach the hospital by way of this foot-
path on the roadway, and that it was actually safer to walk
there than on the sidewalk.187 The jury apparently found that
the plaintiff had violated the statute,'88 but it still ultimately
gave a verdict for plaintiff on grounds of last clear chance.
The Michigan Supreme Court took up the issue of viola-
tions of criminal statutes in negligence cases, holding that the
violation creates a "prima facie" showing of negligence, 8 ' but
that the violator could rebut the prima facie case by demon-
strating an excuse which the jury found to be proper under
the circumstances."90 It is important to characterize the ex-
cuse which plaintiff was asserting in this case, and to differen-
tiate it from the involuntary or non-fault types of excuses we
have been considering. Here, there is no question about the
voluntariness of the act which constituted the statutory viola-
186. Zeni, 397 Mich. at 124, 243 N.W.2d at 273.
187. Testimony in fact indicated that plaintiff had previously slipped when at-
tempting to walk on the sidewalk, and that another person had required hospitaliza-
tion after also falling on the sidewalk. Id.
188. The trial judge's instructions provided that the jury should decide whether
the sidewalks were "provided" according to the statute, and then whether it was
practicable for the plaintiff to walk on the left side of the highway, facing oncoming
traffic. Id. at 124-25, 243 N.W.2d at 273-74.
189. The court seems confused here as to the meaning of "prima facie case."
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
190. 397 Mich. at 128-29, 243 N.W.2d at 276. When the court says that it is up
to the jury to decide what is an "adequate excuse," this has a very different meaning
than it would if the jurisdiction adopted a negligence per se approach to the cases.
Here, the court seems only to mean that the jury will be permitted to hear all the
circumstances of the case and decide whether the facts raised by the plaintiff to ex-
plain the statutory violation adequately overcome the effect which the violation has
(probably in creating a presumption of negligence on her part). Were this a negli-
gence per se jurisdiction, it would not be proper to say that the jury should determine
what is an "adequate excuse" since to give this power to the jury too severely restricts
the judge's power to rule that as a matter of law, certain types of excuses are cogniza-
ble and other types are not. As will be shown infra, the approach taken in Zeni per-
mits far more facts to be heard and considered by the jury than would be permitted
under a negligence per se rule.
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tion. The facts make it plain that the plaintiff chose to walk
on the roadway rather than on the sidewalk, and that she
chose to walk on the right side, rather than the left side.
Therefore, the violation of the statute cannot be called invol-
untary.19' On the other hand, the plaintiff's violation was at
least partly the result of a consensus that it was less danger-
ous to walk where she did than on the snow-covered sidewalk,
though the convenience of not having to cross the street twice
was also a consideration in her action. Taking all of these fac-
tors into account, one way the excuse can be characterized is
that plaintiff intentionally violated the statute because it was
safer to do so than to comply, and that it was customary to do
so under these conditions.
Can the negligence per se theory tolerate an excuse based
on an intentional violation? This presents serious problems,
since to recognize such an excuse would be to say that the
trier of fact could sanction' individual judgments about
whether or not to abide by the statute.19 ' If the legislature
intended to build this kind of flexibility into the standard, it
could presumably have done so. The negligence per se theory
should hold that the most logical course would be to amend or
repeal the statute if it does not properly account for situations
in which it would be safer to take action such as that taken by
the plaintiff.'93 If the theory underlying negligence per se re-
191. The assumption here is that plaintiff's conduct in walking on the right-
hand side of the traveled portion of the roadway was an act in which she voluntarily
engaged. The "choice" element is much more dominant than in the emergency cases,
for example, where the nature of the situation is such that the actor's conduct can
almost be called instinctive rather than voluntary. Here, plaintiff decided to walk
where she did for a number of reasons.
192. This is precisely what Thayer thought to form the theoretical foundation
for negligence per se:
[W]hen eminent courts. . . state that the breach of the ordinance is not
"negligence per se," but only "evidence of negligence," and leave the
question of negligence as a fact to the jury, they are doing nothing less
than informing that body that it may properly stamp with approval, as
reasonable conduct, the action of one who has assumed to place his own
foresight above that of the legislature in respect of the very danger
which it was legislating to prevent.
Thayer, supra note 1, at 322 (footnotes omitted).
193. See Conrad v. Consolidated Ry., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N.E. 180 (1909), criticized
in Unreasonable Standards, supra note 3, at 289 ("attitude of the court implies obe-
dience to the ordinance until resulting deaths inspire its repeal is more desirable than
encroachment by courts on the field of legislative action."). Amendment or repeal,
however, might be very difficult to accomplish, and many persons could be harmed
before the legislature finally acts to change the rule. See supra notes 143-46 and ac-
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quires that a legislative judgment about the safety of certain
action be adhered to and supported, then there is no room for
excusing persons who have sought to substitute their own
judgment for that of the legislature. To allow individuals to
do so would be thf equivalent of a finding that the legislative
standard at times requires unreasonable conduct. Such a de-
termination is completely foreign to negligence per se theory
since it once again injects the common law balancing process
into the case, something which the adoption of the legislative
judgment is supposed to dispose entirely. 94
The excuse asserted in Zeni may also be characterized as
a claim that compliance with the statute would thwart the leg-
islative purpose. This characterization of the excuse might be
more defensible under the negligence per se theory because it
is essentially a claim that the statutory purpose was the more
general one of preventing pedestrians from being injured by
automobiles, and that there is actually no violation of the
statute when its purpose would be thwarted by strict adher-
ence to the terms appearing on its face. While this approach
may be attractive in some ways, it suffers from a serious prob-
lem of statutory interpretation, since a strained construction
of the statute has to be made before it can be held not to
require the very conduct which its terms unequivocally re-
quire. A good illustration of the unsoundness of this approach
companying text.
194. Whether jurisdictions adopting the negligence per se formula can recognize
an excuse to the effect that the statute imposes an unreasonable standard of conduct
has been the subject of much disagreement. The problem can actually work two ways.
The Zeni facts may support an excuse to the effect that compliance with the statute
sometimes requires unreasonably unsafe conduct. At other times, courts wrestle with
the question of whether the statutory standard requires conduct which is too cau-
tious. In Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Elec. Ry., 110 Wis. 331, 85 N.W. 1036 (1901),
for example, a court examined a statute which required trains to continuously ring a
bell within the municipal limits. The court found the statute unreasonable as a safety
measure. A continuously ringing bell on a city street would soon cease to be a true
warning device. See Unreasonable Standards, supra note 3, at 290-91.
Gregory, supra note 1, at 627, would not allow the common law evaluating pro-
cess to take place once a statute has been found to set a standard of care, since to do
so might result in a decision that the conduct "was not sub-standard or negligent."
See supra text accompanying note 33. Morris, on the other hand, claimed that to
refuse to admit evidence as to the unreasonableness of the criminal standard is
wrong, since wholesale adoption of such a standard might create novel civil liability,
something which courts should be careful about doing. Morris, supra note 1, at 40-41.
At base, negligence per se ceases to be negligence per se if the common law evalu-
ating process is injected and can result in a finding that the statutory standard is
either not strict enough or too strict for a particular negligence case.
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is presented by Schumacher v. City of Caldwell.119 There, an
ordinance made it unlawful to permit animals to run at large
in a specified area. The plaintiff's cow was electrocuted by a
high voltage line managed by defendant, and defendant ar-
gued that plaintiff's violation of the ordinance constituted
contributory negligence per se. However, the court found that
the cow had broken away from a reasonably stout restraint,
and that such a restraint was what the statute had the pur-
pose of requiring. It thus refused to find plaintiff in violation
of the ordinance. But to interpret the statute so as not to re-
quire what on its face it clearly does require is a suspect inter-
pretation and not a sound means of avoiding the harsh effects
of the negligence per se doctrine.
The allowance of excuse on the ground that compliance
would thwart the legislative purpose requires a dubiously
broad reading of the purpose of the legislation, and given the
statute in Zeni, there is serious doubt as to whether such a
broad and general construction of the statute's purpose is jus-
tifiable. It would require reading its purpose as merely to pro-
tect the safety of pedestrians, rather than to protect their
safety by requiring that they walk on sidewalks or on a certain
side of the street. 96
The negligence per se doctrine, then, cannot theoretically
accommodate excuses which arise from intentional violations
of the statutory standard, even when those excuses are based
on the assertion that compliance would not be reasonable
under the circumstances.97 Yet the Zeni court is quite right
that the excuse raised there is worthy of consideration by thejury, and our basic concept of negligence cases is jarred by a
doctrine which requires that the jury not even be permitted to
hear the facts which would support the excuse. " 8
Negligence per se also cannot accommodate an excuse
195. 146 Tex. 265, 206 S.W.2d 243 (1947), cited in Morris, supra note 1, at 30
n.35.
196. Concerning the problems of statutory interpretation, see supra notes 35-43
and accompanying text.
197. Another excuse falling into this category would be a violator's claim that
his conduct was as safe or safer than that required by the statute, and so was an
adequate substitute. See Holdych, supra note 3, at 11; Unreasonable Standards,
supra note 3, at 289 (citing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. White, 278 U.S.
456 (1929) (rejecting this excuse)).
198. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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based on official non-enforcement of the statute. 9" Once the
legislature has spoken in enacting a law, it should be no ex-
cuse that the executive chooses not to enforce it. It is still the
law. An interesting example of the harshness of this result is
Day v. Pauly.200 T iere, the plaintiff made a left turn following
markings on the highway which permitted turns to the left of
center of an intersection. The markings, however, were set up
in a manner which permitted turns in violation of a criminal
statute. Despite the fact that the plaintiff merely followed
markings which had been made by a governmental authority,
the court found him contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, stating that "travelers are not warranted or justified in
proceeding according to the direction of highway officials...
where such directions are contrary to the express provision of
the law. .. ."110 In this case, then, the court found that there
was no room for a jury determination of whether the circum-
stances warranted a finding of contributory negligence; the
plaintiff who followed what appeared to be lawful directions
of the government was negligent as a matter of law.2 e0
In the absence of a statute, evidence supporting each of
the kinds of excuses we have been considering would be rele-
vant to a determination of the nature of the party's conduct.
Yet negligence per se theory would usually seem to require
the judge to rule that evidence supporting the purported ex-
cuse be excluded in these cases.203 If negligence doctrine de-
veloped through the application of general principles to
199. Unreasonable Standards, supra note 3, at 287 (citing Riser v. Smith, 136
Minn. 417, 162 N.W. 520 (1917)); Cleveland C., C. & I. Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind.
426, 30 N.E. 37 (1892).
200. 186 Wis. 189, 202 N.W. 363 (1925), cited in Morris, supra note 1, at 29.
201. 186 Wis. at 194, 202 N.W. at 365.
202. Though the negligence per se doctrine would mandate results such as those
reached in Day v. Pauly, some courts have used dubious means of avoiding such re-
sults. In Johnson v. Garnand, 18 Ariz. App. 191, 501 P.2d 32 (1972), for example,
defendant violated pavement markings which required a left turn at a certain point.
Rather than turn, defendant proceeded straight for a short distance. Though the
court found him negligent as a matter of law in the subsequent collision with plain-
tiff's car, defendant was allowed to prove that as many as 95 percent of the drivers
did what he did at that intersection. The court admitted this evidence on the issue of
plaintiff's contributory negligence. The jury found for defendant on the ground that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and this result was affirmed on appeal. The
result, however, is totally contrary to the underlying basis of the negligence per se
doctrine.
203. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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widely varying circumstances,0 4 then the willing acceptance
of legislative determinations of specific standards in place of
this well-developed formula, and the exclusion of evidence
which is a necessary concomittant of such a choice, substan-
tially changes the character of the negligence action. Negli-
gence law has always permitted the trier of fact great flex-
ibility in determining the nature of conduct under all the
circumstances. The introduction of criminal legislation should
not be permitted to so change the character of the action.
That courts and even legislatures perceive the need to
permit juries great flexibility in negligence cases, even when
statutes are involved, is well illustrated by California's han-
dling of violations of automobile speed laws. California has
not adopted the negligence per se standard, opting instead for
the establishment of a rebuttable presumption of negligence
when a safety statute has been violated.2 0 5 This standard,
however, also grants legislation substantial deference, and
even requires a shift of the burden of persuasion to the viola-
tor to demonstrate that he was not negligent2s6 While most
violations of California safety legislation are so treated, speed
limit violations are exempted from this procedural effect.207
Pattern jury instructions make this clear by providing that ju-
ries be instructed that
[t]he . . . speed limit . . . where the accident occurred
... is ... to be considered by you, together with all the
other evidence in determining whether or not the (defen-
dant) was negligent, but proof that a vehicle was traveling
at a speed greater or less than **** miles per hour does
not, in and of itself, prove that the driver of that vehicle
was or was not negligent. 06
This is a curious rule, particularly when it is compared
with the pattern instruction used when other safety statutes
204. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
205. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West 1967); see supra note 88.
206. Id.
207. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40831 (West 1971) provides:
In any civil action proof of speed in excess of any prima facie limit de-
clared in Section 22352 at a particular time and place does not establish
negligence as a matter of law but in all such actions it shall be necessary
to establish as a fact that the operation of a vehicle at the excess speed
constituted negligence.
208. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 5.31 (6th ed. 1977).
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are involved.2 09 Why would the legislature enact a provision
specifically providing that violation of a posted speed limit
does not establish negligence as a matter of law, 10 when in all
other situations it is the policy of the legislature, following the
lead of the courts, 11 that statutory violations shall create a
presumption of negligence shifting to the violator the burden
of persuasion on that issue? One can only speculate about this
question, but it is possible that the legislature recognized that
even where a speed limit violation can truly be labeled a cause
of the accident, juries should be free to determine the negli-
gence issue in light of all the circumstances of the case. Courts
have lent further support to the more liberal rule in speed vio-
lation cases by providing that it is error to refuse to instruct
the jury that speed limit violations are merely evidence of
negligence.' 1
Thus, even in a jurisdiction which has not adopted the
negligence per se standard, there is discomfort about some ap-
plications of a doctrine which would give such substantial ef-
fect to the statutory standard and so greatly impact the reso-
lution of the negligence case. If some discomfort exists in a
jurisdiction which has embraced a standard less rigid than
negligence per se,' 1 8 then there should be even greater concern
where the negligence per se doctrine has been adopted. And
indeed, when one considers the results which would be man-
dated by negligence per se in speed limit violation cases, it
209. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIvEL 3.45 (6th ed. 1977):
If you find that a party to this action violated... the (statute)...
just read to you (and that such violation was a proximate cause of injury
to another or to himself), you will find that such violation was negli-
gence (unless such party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary pru-
dence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with
the law).
This instruction is based on CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (West 1967).
210. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40831 (West 1967).
211. Alarid v. Vanier, 60 Cal. 2d 617, 621-22, 327 P.2d 897, 898-99 (1958);
Saterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 589, 177 P.2d 279, 283 (1947).
212. Hodges v. Severns, 201 Cal. App. 2d 99, 110-11, 20 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136-37
(1962).
213. The standard developed in Alarid v. Vanier, 60 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897
(1958), and subsequently codified in CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (West 1967), recognizes a
broad excuse whenever the violator can prove that he did what might reasonably be
expected of a person of ordinary prudence, in similar circumstances, who desired to
comply with the law. This broad excuse obviously goes far beyond the excuses which
can be tolerated by strict adherence to the negligence per se doctrine.
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becomes clear that juries will have their 'hands tied in any
case in which it can be shown that the speed limit violation
was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. This pos-
sibility likely offended the California legislature's sense of jus-
tice, and not unreasonably S0.2 " Nevertheless, strict adher-
ence to negligence per se theory would mandate a finding of
negligence in such cases. 1
Other statutory violations are similarly inappropriate as
conclusive on the negligence issue. If violation of the speed
limit should only be some evidence of negligence, why not also
include violations of traffic laws regarding signaling of
turns,'21 6 or prohibiting U-turns in business or residential dis-
tricts?2 17 Each of these traffic laws is safety-oriented. Yet
there is something about each of them which makes us feel
that juries should not be tied into holding an actor negligent
merely for violating them and having contributed to the dam-
ages sustained. It is hard to define precisely how these stat-
utes give rise to such a reaction, but perhaps we are reacting
to our own knowledge about the frequency with which such
laws are violated, or the seeming unfairness of saddling defen-
dants with huge liability for violating admittedly safety-ori-
ented, but often minor, provisions. 2 8 The same reaction
would be justified when the adoption of negligence per se
would require a court to refuse recovery to a plaintiff who has
violated one of these statutes. The California solution for
most statutes may not go as far as it could in granting juries
their traditional power in determining breach of the standard
214. The same result has apparently been reached in Texas. See Statutory Ex-
cuse, supra note 3, at 113. The author suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely on the
violation of a speed law to establish negligence, but that negligence will be measured
as it would be at common law - determining whether the conduct was unreasonable.
215. Gregory took this position:
[Siuppose . . . [a motorist] violates . . . a statute specifying 45 miles
per hour as the maximum speed on a certain stretch of highway. No
matter how skillfully he has otherwise handled his car, he has fallen
short of official statutory rules of conduct and to that extent is automat-
ically negligent. If he becomes involved in harm arising out of risks
which these statutes were designed to prevent, then he is either liable or
is denied recovery, whatever the case may be.
Gregory, supra note 1, at 635.
216. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22107 (West 1971).
217. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22102 (West 1971) (U-turns in business dis-
tricts); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22103 (West 1971) (U-turns in residential districts).
218. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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of care.2 91 Nevertheless, that approach at least recognizes both
that there are situations in which the statutory violation can
be no more than some evidence of negligence, and that in all
other cases, an actor will be excused if he can demonstrate
that he acted as would a reasonable person who desired to
comply with the law.2-0
In sum, the negligence standard thrives on the considera-
tion of the circumstances of individual cases, but the theory
underlying negligence per se does not permit consideration of
those circumstances. Yet even courts adopting negligence per
se have typically found ways to permit consideration of many
of the circumstances which the theory cannot tolerate. A bet-
ter solution would be for courts to abandon the theory and
turn to one which both accords with the traditional roles of
judge and jury in deciding negligence cases, and gives due def-
erence to the legislature. That standard would be either of
those which treats violations of criminal statutes as creating a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. Even the briefest look
at how the presumption approaches would handle these cases,
including claims of "excuse," will demonstrate their fitness.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
APPROACHES
Either standard which would hold that proof of a statu-
tory violation creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence
would solve the theoretical and institutional problems from
which the negligence per se standard suffers. Both presump-
tion approaches would require taking account of the will of
the legislature while at the same time permitting the trier of
fact to make a determination based on all of the circum-
stances of the case. Moreover, the court would retain its
power to determine whether a duty is owed, and if so, whether
it can be defined more sharply than with the broad "reasona-
ble person" standard. However, the balance which must be
struck between competing interests is a delicate one, and the
advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative versions
of this standard must be outlined.
First, however, the flaws of the "mere evidence" of negli-
219. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 88.
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gence' l ' and "prima facie evidence" standards222 must be
pointed out. According to the "mere evidence" approach, evi-
dence of the statutory violation is only relevant to the negli-
gence issue, creating at best an inference of negligence, which
is of little procedural importance. The "prima facie evidence"
standard does little more, assuring the non-violator only that
he has met his burden of production on the negligence issue.
Proof of the violation places no formal burden on the violator.
Neither standard, therefore, requires the jury to give special
weight to the statutory violation, and thus the jury is free to
refuse to give any more weight to the violation than to any
other facts bearing on the negligence issue. Because they
grant no special deference to the authority of the legislature
to regulate conduct through lawmaking, these standards pre-
sent the opposite theoretical flaw to that presented by the
negligence per se approach. While this article has mainly fo-
cused on the disadvantages of granting too much deference to
the legislative standard, it has hardly been suggested that an
implied legislative judgment about conduct which constitutes
due care should be granted so little credence. Just as many
advocates of legislative nullification would still insist that
most legislation be accorded a "retentionist bias,"2 it is sug-
gested that due deference to the legislative function requires
that some onus be placed on the violator. The issue of how
great an onus will now be examined.
As already indicated, there are two primary approaches to
the effect of the presumption of negligence created upon proof
of the statutory violation. One, the "bursting bubble" ap-
proach, views the presumption as merely shifting the burden
of production on that issue, and holds that the presumption
completely disappears when evidence of due care is pro-
duced.""' The other approach views the presumption as in-
tended to effectuate important public policy, and requires a
shifting of the burden of persuasion on the negligence issue.
Moreover, this second approach holds that even in the light of
evidence of due care, the presumption remains a part of the
case.
22 5
221. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
223. See G. CALABRasi, supra note 2, at 163-66.
224. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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The choice of which view to adopt can have an important
impact on the outcome of the negligence action. This can best
be demonstrated with an example. Suppose that a statute pro-.
hibits drivers from crossing the center line of a highway.226
Following an accident in which the plaintiff was injured when
the car he was driving was struck by the defendant's car,
plaintiff alleges that defendant should be found negligent for
having crossed over the center line, causing the accident. As-
suming that defendant does not contest the violation itself,22
the presumption of negligence will now operate. If the "burst-
ing bubble" approach is adopted, defendant's burden will be
to go forward with some evidence of due care; if she does not
do so, a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the negli-
gence issue is almost assured.2 28 However, how difficult is it
likely to be for defendant to come forward with some evidence
of due care to satisfy this burden? In our example, this might
not be at all difficult. Defendant might testify that she
swerved to avoid hitting a child or an animal which had sud-
denly ventured onto the street. She might testify that the
car's steering, which she had exercised care in maintaining,
suddenly malfunctioned, causing her to lose control.22 Satis-
faction of the burden of producing evidence is not too difficult
in general,23 0 and in negligence actions, wherein some evidence
of care can usually be found, allegedly negligent parties
should be able to reach the jury in most cases.2 1 It may even
226. This possibility is posed by the Illustration to Clause (2)(d) of RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). See supra note 177.
227. If the violation is contested, the jury will normally be asked to consider
that question and reach a conclusion.
228. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, § 345, at 820.
229. This is reminiscent of the excuse asserted by the defendant in Alarid v.
Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958), which involved the failure of brakes.
Defendant asserted that he had had his brakes checked on a number of occasions,
and had no reason to know that they might malfunction.
230. See supra note 66.
231. There seems to be an inherent difference between the kind of presump-
tions normally referred to in the cases and the particular presumption with which we
are here concerned. A typical example of the former is the presumption that a letter
properly addressed and mailed is presumed to have been received in the ordinary
course of the mail. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 641 (West 1967). In this situation, both the
basic fact (mailing) and the presumed fact (receipt in the ordinary course of the mail)
are fairly concrete matters. The party against whom the presumption operates will
typically have either no evidence to rebut the presumption, or he will have substan-
tial evidence (probably to the effect that he checked the mail daily for a certain pe-
riod of time and never saw the letter).
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be that in presenting his own version of the facts, the plaintiff
will reveal sufficient evidence of defendant's care to dissolve
the presumption of negligence."' Meeting the burden of going
forward, therefore, should be easy in a large number of negli-
gence cases. Because the presumption will no longer operate
at this point, the fact of the statutory violation will become
but one factor for the jury to weigh in determining whether
under all the circumstances, the defendant exercised due
care. 283
Suppose, however, that in our example the court adopts
the approach which shifts to the defendant the burden of per-
suasion on the negligence issue once the statutory violation
has been proven. While it may not be difficult for defendant
to avoid a directed verdict by producing some evidence of due
care, the shift of the burden of persuasion will present a far
more substantial obstacle to avoiding liability. Plaintiffs will
therefore prevail in more cases than under the first theory.3 4
Which of these theories best strides between the excessive
weight which the negligence per se standard grants to legisla-
tion and the contempt for legislative power which the "mere
evidence" and "prima facie evidence" standards exemplify?
As the previous discussion should illustrate, the primary prob-
lem with the approach which shifts only the burden of pro-
The presumption of negligence, however, appears to be qualitatively different.
While the basic fact (the statutory violation) can be reasonably concrete, especially if
the offense consists of a simple act such as crossing the center line of a highway, the
same cannot be said of the presumed fact (that the violator was negligent). The pre-
sumed fact is by its nature a legal conclusion dependent upon the particular circum-
stances of the case. It is not a concrete thing, and indeed that is a major part of the
problem to which this entire article is addressed. Because the violator will almost
always be able to present some evidence from which an inference of due care can be
drawn, the presumption will likely be far more fragile than the usual kind of pre-
sumption exemplified by the letter example. Perhaps this argues for a greater proce-
dural effect to be accorded to this particular presumption.
232. In the example of the driver who crossed the center line of the highway,
the plaintiff, merely in telling his version of the facts, might divulge the fact of the
child running into the road. Although plaintiff's lawyer might foresee this possibility
and seek to prevent the fact from being revealed on direct examination of the plain-
tiff, the information could easily be brought out on cross-examination. In such a case,
the defendant could arguably be found to have met her burden of going forward with
evidence without offering any case at all aside from possibly cross-examining the
plaintiff.
233. This does not mean that jurors will not often grant great weight to the fact
of a statutory violation. See supra note 58.
234. See Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write
into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REV. 167, 197-98 (1979).
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duction is that too often, that burden will be easily satisfied
and the presumption will disappear. The jury will not be in-
structed about the presumption, evidence of the statutory vio-
lation will simply be submitted along with all the other evi-
dence, and the weighing process will proceed as it would in
any negligence action. If the flaw in the "mere evidence" and
"prima facie evidence" standards is that the jury is not re-
quired to grant the statutory violation any special place in its
determination of the negligence issue, then this approach to
presumptions will have the same effect in those cases in which
the violator can come forward with some evidence of due care.
This may not be a fatal flaw, however. The violator will still
have been required to come forward with some evidence of
due care, which is more than is theoretically required under
the two lesser standards.
The approach which requires a shift of the burden of per-
suasion once the violation has been demonstrated does not
suffer from this problem since the onus placed on the statu-
tory violator will be much greater, and the jury will be in-
structed in a manner which makes this clear.2 85 A problem
with the standard, however, is that it raises the possibility
that jurors will feel compelled to give too much weight to the
statutory violation. Though such an effect is not a necessary
consequence of knowing that the burden of persuasion regard-
ing due care falls on the violator, it is unclear that juries
would understand the importance of reaching a verdict which
takes into account all the circumstances. This could under-
mine the general negligence formula and lead to the same lack
of flexible standards from which the negligence per se ap-
proach suffers. In addition, shifting the burden of proof on an
essential element of the negligence action works a transforma-
tion in this class of negligence cases which courts have not
found necessary in other areas of negligence law. The fact that
it is the legislature which has determined the nature of the
duty, rather than the common law process, may not in itself
justify a move away from the long-standing view that it is the
party alleging negligence who must prove it.28 While a shift in
the burden of persuasion is said to be required because the
235. For the California version of this instruction, see supra note 209.




presumption serves the important public policy of assuring
that persons abide by statutory rules of conduct, the same
strong policy exists with regard to judicially-developed stan-
dards of conduct. Yet the courts have been unwilling to shift
the burden of persuasion in those cases, even when the evi-
dence of negligence seems substantial 287
Potential flaws can therefore be found in both "presump-
tion" approaches. Nevertheless, either approach solves the se-
rious problems posed by the negligence per se standard.
Neither amounts to a complete abrogation of the court's
power to set the standard of care for negligence cases. The
court, for example, could still determine that the imposition
of a duty under the particular circumstances of the case would
not be appropriate. This is particularly important where the
statutory standard would impose a duty of care which would
be completely absent (not merely more generally stated) at
common law.288 As Morris declared, when courts are faced
with a defendant who, absent the criminal statute, would
clearly not have been civilly liable, "expanded civil duties may
be-but are not necessarily-appropriate."'2 9
The jury, too, will retain its traditional role of weighing
all the circumstances and reaching a decision as to whether
the duty of care was adequately discharged. Under either view
of presumptions, most negligence cases involving statutes
should reach the jury, as do negligence cases which do not in-
volve statutes.
The administration of "excuses" will also become a sim-
ple matter, since the crucial issue will no longer be whether a
237. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur poses an interesting illustration. Thatdoctrine establishes a set of criteria by which to measure the strength of purely cir-
cumstantial evidence of negligence. The criteria generally require a showing that thisis the kind of accident which does not normally occur in the absence of negligence,
and that the instrumentality of the accident was in the exclusive control of the defen-dant. See W. PRossBR, aupra note 48, § 39. If these criteria can be met, the burden ofgoing forward with evidence is shifted to the defendant because, among other reasons,it is felt that the circumstantial evidence of negligence is so strong that the defendant
should be made to come forward with at least some evidence of due care. However,
only this burden is shifted; the burden of persuasion remains with the party alleging
negligence.
Of course, in certain cases the courts do shift the burden of persuasion on otherissues, such as causation. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
Even in these cases, however, the burden of persuasion on the negligence issue re-
mains with the party alleging the other party's negligence.
238. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
239. Morris, supra note 1, at 26.
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violation can be excused lest a directed verdict on the negli-
gence issue follow, but merely whether other circumstances in
the case warrant a finding that despite the violation of the
statute, there was no negligence. There will be no need to de-
rive a theory which categorizes excuses into those which imply
"involuntary" violations 40 and those involving "intentional"
violations."'4 The court will therefore be able to avoid having
to make difficult decisions about whether the jury should be
permitted to hear any evidence of certain excusing conditions.
The party who has violated the statute will simply offer evi-
dence of the circumstances surrounding the violation, all of
which (except for those which the common law traditionally
refuses to consider) 242 will be relevant to the negligence issue.
The result will be that the proper administration of "excuses"
will no longer be a roadblock to the jury's ability to render a
decision based on all circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Some commentators have suggested that there may be lit-
tle difference between a test which declares that safety legisla-
tion should be conclusive on the negligence issue, and one
which says that the violation of such a statute should create a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. 2'4 8 This article has
demonstrated that there is indeed a great theoretical differ-
ence between the negligence per se and rebuttable presump-
tion approaches, particularly insofar as they represent diver-
gent philosophies about the degree to which legislatively-
derived standards, fixed and uniform as they are, can be effec-
tively incorporated into negligence cases. Moreover, it should
also be clear that the choice between negligence per se and
rebuttable presumption will significantly affect the degree to
which the jury will retain its traditional role as a weigher of
all the circumstances, both tangible and intangible, in negli-
gence cases.
The most significant result of the adoption and proper
administration of either of the presumption approaches will
240. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 19.
243. Morris, supra note 1, at 34-35 (referring to a fairly strict interpretation of
an evidence of negligence standard); W. PROSSER, supra note 48, § 36, at 201 (refer-
ring to the California standard).
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be that a sound system of adjudication of negligence cases will
not be rendered susceptible to the jarring changes which an
increasingly active legislature often imposes. If the imposition
of legislation into negligence cases is in truth wholly a matter
of court control,'" and does not amount to abrogation of stan-
dard-setting power to the legislature, then judicial discretion
should be used to accommodate the legislative will, while at
the same time maintaining the delicate balance of functions
which negligence cases require and on which they thrive. The
dynamic process of the common law demands no less.
244. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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